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 Background 
 
Housing is a basic human right, recognised by Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights1, and one of the most fundamental human needs. However, it has occupied a 
relatively weak position within systems of welfare when compared to other domains of social 
policy, such as social protection/security, health, and education. In most countries, housing is 
largely a market commodity modified by subsidies and regulation (Kemeny 2001) and is by 
far the largest single item in household budgets. It can absorb a significant proportion 
household income, affecting food choices, healthcare needs, and educational prospects.  
 
Housing not only affects the wellbeing of individuals and aspects of social inclusion and 
exclusion (Somerville, Sprigings 2005), but also shapes the quality of the built environment 
Williams 2015). In capital cities, where there is a high demand for housing, but also 
limitations in terms of land and housing supply, widening economic inequality is aggravating 
housing costs that exceed what low to middle income families can afford. Spiralling house 
prices are creating a global urban housing affordability crisis (Wetzstein 2017).  
 
Excessive housing costs are a barrier to the supply of lower income workers and are 
increasing the prevalence of poor housing conditions, related to overcrowding, insecurity of 
tenure, and in some cases homelessness, reflecting in many ways a civilizational setback in 
those areas.  
 
There is increasing political and academic interest in investigating approaches and tools to 
help solve this unfortunate urban and social crisis. This report focuses upon the relationship 
between land-use planning and housing, as the planning system has been used by public 
authorities to influence the volume, type, location and affordability of new housing. As 
emphasised by Oxley (2004), it may be expected that in addition to the instruments of 
housing policy, planning tools can also have some effect in making housing more affordable 
for certain sections of the population. However, as international comparative analysis has 
exposed, the type and degree of government influence on planning and housing depend on 
the history, politics and values of each society, thus justifying the comparative perspective 
adopted by this project. 
  
                                                 
1 Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being and that of their family, 
including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social services. 
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 Aim of the research 
The aim of this research is to investigate how land-use planning has contributed to the 
provision of affordable housing for low income people within new developments in three 
capital cities - Copenhagen, Lisbon, and London - and how it has contributed to the mix of 
housing tenures within new developments. It focuses upon the last 10 years and on 
Copenhagen, Lisbon, and London. More specifically, it examines:  Have public authorities 
attempted to mandate or encourage developers to incorporate a proportion of affordable 
homes into their market-driven developments? What has been the relevance of requiring on 
site affordable housing provision as part of general market developments, and as a condition 
of planning approval? How have they done so? What has been accomplished and what has 
been learnt so far? 
 
This report presents some of the key findings of the fieldwork carried out in London, Lisbon 
and Copenhagen between January and July 2019. Its insights are intended to stimulate 
debate on how to best translate findings into policy and practice during a workshop 
convened by the Cambridge Centre for Housing & Planning that will take place in 
Cambridge, on 2 December 2019.  Some of the findings gathered during the fieldwork in the 
context of interviews and site visits, have not been included in this report. They will be 
explored in further works. 
 
 Methods 
Bearing in mind that knowledge and practices are culturally bound and relative, the research 
methodology employed interpretive methods to scrutinise policies and practices in relation 
to their specific social, cultural, and political contexts. Because knowledge is, in the first place, 
constructed according to the cognitive structures of human thinking and relates to lived 
experience and the understandings that ensue, a crucial part of this research involved 
qualitative methods, i.e. interviews and thematic data analysis, in order to grasp how 
policymakers, local practitioners, consultants and experts interpret, use, or evaluate the 
potential of planning tools to provide social and affordable housing.  
 
There were several stages in the methods employed to undertake this study. 
 
The first step in the research was to undertake a literature review in order to consolidate 
existing knowledge of the current research on housing and planning and the regulatory 
frameworks used for the provision of social and affordable housing in each country. 
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The second step in the research consisted of an analysis of secondary data, examining 
economic and social conditions, e.g. poverty rates, housing cost overburden rate by tenure, 
etc. In the report, when there is no statistical data available specifically for England, or when 
it is more appropriate, aggregated United Kingdom data is used.  
 
The third step consisted of drafting qualitative semi-structured interview guidelines, which 
included a set of descriptive, normative, and causal questions about substantive and 
processual issues related to the use of planning tools to tackle the housing crisis. 
 
A fourth step consisted of in depth, face to face interviews with various stakeholders and 
experts in the formulation, implementation or evaluation of housing and planning policies. A 
total of 62 semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and July 2019 in 
London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. An outline of the interviewees’ institutional affiliations is 
presented in Annex 1. To maintain confidentiality and protect the identity of the 
interviewees, the list was anonymised, and no further details are provided on age, 
professional backgrounds, work roles, previous jobs, or gender. The interviews were 
anonymous in order to encourage respondents to be as open and transparent about their 
views as possible.  
 
The sampling and recruitment procedure followed a combination of purposive and snowball 
sampling. Initial emails were sent to the departments of land use planning and housing for 
local, regional and national authorities (central government departments responsible for 
housing and land-use planning, and arm’s length companies). Non-profit housing 
associations, academics and consultants who shape processes of policymaking were also 
invited to participate by email. The objectives of the study were set out in the email and 
interviews were scheduled.  
 
During the interviews, interviewees were also encouraged to name a number of other 
stakeholders who might be interested in participating, facilitating access to new interviewees. 
All interviews were conducted in locations chosen by the interviewees and, in the case of 
London and Lisbon, in their native language. Interviews followed all the ethical procedures 
related to research practice. Interviewees were informed about the aims of the study. All the 
interviews were digitally recorded with the permission of each interviewee, anonymised and 
subsequently transcribed.  
 
The fifth step involved the analysis of the collected data to generate a list of key words, 
ideas, phrases, and verbatim quotes. A thematic approach to data analysis was used, with 
themes deriving from theoretical literature as well as derived inductively from the qualitative 
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data collected in interviews. The coding strategy was data-driven, and codes were derived 
from the words and phrases used by interviewees. 
 
To ensure that the analysis was firmly grounded within the data, the report incorporates 
verbatim quotes to better illustrate the prevailing ideas held by urban planners, decision-
makers and other key stakeholders on the topics. 
 
The research also included short term visits to planning and housing departments and to 
development sites in all three cities, to capture nuances in the application of planning 
obligations for the provision of affordable housing.  
 
The research generated a large source of information, and this report presents only a part of 
this. Space and time limits prevent a complete description and analysis of the data collected 
during field work.  
 
 
 
 Case studies: justification  
The choice of countries and capital cities for the current project can be classified as ‘strategic 
sampling’ based on expectations regarding information content and maximizing information 
utility. It is possible to justify it on several grounds. 
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 Welfare state provision 
The three countries are good representatives of different traditions of welfare state provision 
(see below), or of the ‘welfare triangle’, in terms of the qualitatively different arrangements 
between the state, the market, and the family (Alves & Burgess 2018).  
 Common issues  
Secondly, differences in terms of governance structure, scale, economic performance, and 
demography notwithstanding, their capital cities are the main economic and political drivers 
of the respective countries, and have in common several trends, including increasing housing 
costs, problems of housing shortage and affordability, and processes of displacement and 
gentrification. 
 Common developments and debate 
Thirdly, these capital cities have in common a lot of developments and affordable housing 
production, a lot of grassroots initiatives and of debates about housing affordability. 
 
Table 1 General information on the demographic and socio-economic context of the 
selected countries 
 
 Km2 Pop. 
(*1,000)  
Foreign 
population 
(%) 
Inhabitants 
per km² 
(2015) 
GDP per capita / adjusted 
for purchasing power 
(USD) 
Denmark 42,934 5,827 
(2019) 
8.4 131.9 49,613 
UK  246,610 64,5  9.2 261 41,159 
Portugal  91,916 10,627 
(2018) 
3.9 112.5 15,400 
Source: Statistics Denmark (2019), INE (2011) 
 
It is important to recall that Esping-Andersen (1990), who developed and applied the 
concepts of stratification and decommodification2 to an empirical comparative analysis of 18 
countries, classifies Denmark and United Kingdom as, respectively, representatives of two 
different ideal types: the social-democratic regime, characterised by universal provision of 
social security, health, and education that reduces levels of commodification and 
                                                 
2 Esping-Andersen (1990) defines de-commodification’ as the ability of individuals or households to enjoy an 
acceptable standard of living independent of market participation, that is, without relying upon income earned in 
the market sphere.  
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stratification, and the liberal regime, characterised by high reliance upon the market and a 
means-tested approach and conditional to benefits (based on the beneficiary's income 
and/or wealth). Using an intermediate level of de-commodification, he also identifies the 
corporatist regime, in which he places Italy, characterised by a level of social protection 
based essentially on the status of individuals in the labour market and the history of paid 
contributions, with the exception of social assistance. The low level of state intervention and 
high reliance upon family support to compensate for the widespread insufficiencies of such 
intervention has justified the inclusion of Portugal in another ideal type of Mediterranean 
regime (Alves & Andersen 2019). Table 2 presents a typology of welfare state regimes based 
on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Alves (2017). It is important to notice that the redistributive 
effects of these welfare states are low-income differences and poverty rates in the case of 
Denmark, and high levels of poverty and inequality in the case of the United Kingdom and 
Portugal. 
 
Table 2 A typology of welfare state regimes based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and 
Alves (2017)  
 
 Esping-Andersen 
(1990) Typology 
of welfare state 
regimes 
Levels of 
housing de-
commodificati
on 
Levels of stratification Levels of 
economic 
inequality/ risk 
of poverty  
Denmark Social Democratic  High / non-
profit housing 
associations 
Low levels of 
differentiation 
(universalism)  
Low 
United 
Kingdom 
Liberal Low private 
sector 
High levels of 
differentiation (use of 
means-testing) 
High 
Portugal  Mediterranean Low private 
sector 
High levels of 
differentiation (based on 
social occupational 
status, use of means-
testing) family 
responsibility 
High  
 
Figure 1, which displays the evolution of the population ‘at risk of poverty rate’, after social 
transfers and using the cut-off point of 60% of median equivalised income (that is, the 
population with disposable income below the national at-risk-of-poverty threshold), shows 
that the highest at risk of poverty rates exist in Portugal, whereas the lowest rates have been 
observed in Denmark, reflecting a more egalitarian distribution of income. 
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Figure 1 Population at risk of poverty rate after social transfers (2008-2016) - cut-off 
point: 60% of median equivalised income) 
 
Source: EU-SILC (2019) 
 
 Structure of the report  
The remainder of the report is organised into two parts. The first part provides an 
introduction to aspects of policy formulation, looking at policy goals and policy means as the 
main components of policy making. It then looks at the main features of the planning 
systems in the three countries in terms of their legal and administrative systems, and their 
traditions (dominant values, cultures, etc.). Finally, the report discusses the long structuration 
of the three cities’ rental markets, and offers a conceptualisation of the key terms used in this 
report such as the concepts of ‘social housing’, ‘affordable housing’, and ‘housing 
affordability’ vis-à-vis aspects of rent-setting, provision, and policy targeting, etc.  
 
The second section is primarily based on the qualitative data collected from semi-structured 
interviews in London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen. It discusses how planning policies have 
assisted in the provision of affordable housing in these cities.  
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 Planning for affordable housing: an introduction 
 
 Policy goals and means 
Comparing the formulation and implementation of policies is an important task as it can be a 
source of policy learning, generating feedback that will help to inform future rounds of 
policy-making. It can also promote dialogue, the exchange of ideas, and create collective 
learning around what can be done. 
 
This is crucial because governments, at the same stage of economic development, have a 
choice between different options. They can, for example, choose to promote home 
ownership, the rental sector, or opt for tenure neutrality, trying to offer similar conditions for 
those owning or renting a dwelling. Alternatively, they may adopt a residual model of social 
housing reserved for the poorest segments of the population or promote a more universal 
model that aimed at providing good quality rental housing at cost price. 
 
Comparative studies have identified trends of internationalisation of policy design, with 
concepts and instruments travelling across borders (Peck, Theodore 2015). However, it 
should be emphasised that some ideas seem more likely to travel (e.g. right to buy) than 
others (land value capture), especially since the 2008 global financial crisis, which reinforced 
the alignment between post-2008 austerity politics and longer-running processes of 
neoliberal urbanism (Theodore 2019).  
 
Research developed in different countries and cities, such as, for example, Olesen & Carter 
(2018), who have shown a public policy shift from traditional statist to more privatised 
models of service delivery; or Branco & Alves (2019) who have scrutinised the dimensions of 
discourse and sociocultural practice in the field of housing renewal in Portugal-, has shown 
that periods of crisis and austerity (such as the one that followed the stock market crash of 
2008), have actually supported more liberal thinking, grounded in the allegedly virtues of the 
market. 
 
At various levels of government, the way problems are discursively formulated and 
articulated, given that this contains an explicit or implicit diagnosis as to what the problem is 
and how it should be addressed, allows us to understand the processes of decision making, 
in terms of goals, and the selection of techniques from a toolbox that policymakers use to 
attain their goals. However, this process is highly constrained by aspects of credibility, 
financial capacity, fiscality, etc., and it also depends upon an understanding of the costs and 
benefits associated with different policy tools or instruments vis à vis the problems identified 
at the agenda setting stage. 
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Howlett (2011) distinguishes “substantive implementation instruments”, i.e. those used to 
directly affect the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services, from 
“procedural implementation instruments”, “those policy techniques or mechanisms 
designated to directly or indirectly affect the behaviour of those involved in the production, 
consumption and distribution of different kinds of goods and services in society.” (Idem: 25). 
He explained that the latter influence structures the game without determining the outcome. 
The table below, based on Howlett (2011), illustrates how policy goals and policy means, the 
principal components of policy formulation, tend to be arranged in several layers. The rows 
identify the policy goals and policy means at different levels of policymaking (meta-level, 
programme level, and ground level). 
 
Table 3 Policy goals and means, based on Howlett (2011) 
 Meta-level/high 
level of abstraction 
Programme level; 
operationalization 
Programme setting; 
specific on the 
ground measures  
Policy goals 
 
General macro-level; 
government 
statements;    
definition of policy 
aims and ambitions  
 
Specific meso-level 
areas that policies 
are expected to 
address in order to 
achieve policy aims; 
operationable policy 
objectives 
Specific policy 
targets, that is, 
specific, ground-
level micro-
requirements 
necessary to attain 
policy objectives  
Policy means General policy 
implementation; 
preferences in terms 
of organizational 
devices,  
for example, for 
market, public or 
non profit 
intervention), for 
universal targeting 
(groups, territories) 
Policy instruments; 
policy choices in 
terms of instruments 
used to address 
programme level 
objectives 
Specific policy tool 
calibrations 
 
Source: Adapted from Howlett (2011: 34).   
 
It is possible, therefore, after Howlett & Cashore (2014), to define policy as “actions which 
contains goal(s), and the means to achieve them” (Idem: 17), and to consider policymaking 
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as an activity that involves both a technical and political process of articulating and matching 
actors’ goals and means.  
 
Table 4 summarises some of the key policy goals and means used in England. Further 
operationalisation will be developed later for the case of London. 
 
Table 4 Planning Policy goals and means 
 Meta-level (Government 
priorities)   
 
Programme level; 
operationalization 
Policy goals 
 
Accelerate the planning 
process 
 
Assist developers to build 
more homes, and to build 
their share of affordable 
homes 
 
Support the delivery of new 
housing and major 
infrastructure projects 
 
Policies to capture land value 
around the development of 
new infrastructure projects 
 
Strategic Housing Market 
Assessment (SHMA) of the need for 
social and affordable housing 
(build the right type of housing to 
meet needs) 
 
Local development plans and 
policies 
 
Identification of vacant and 
brownfield land 
 
Policies that require contributions 
in the form of affordable housing 
along with market housing as a 
condition of planning permission 
 
Policy means General policy 
implementation; (preferences 
in terms of organizational 
devices) 
 
Private developers, housing 
associations, councils 
 
 
Section 106 of the Town and 
Country Planning Act 1990 
 
Financial tools:  
- Housing Infrastructure 
Fund, a capital grant 
programme to ensure 
necessary infrastructure is in 
place to unlock housing;  
- Housing programmes 
(capital grant) 
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Information-based (brownfield 
registration) 
 
Planning exemption to facilitate the 
conversion of commercial and 
industrial properties into homes 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is also important also to note that, whilst Howlett & Cashore (2014) emphasise the 
relevance of policy as a set of interrelated decisions taken by political actors or a group of 
actors that concerns the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specific 
situation, Zittoun (2014) claims that, beyond politics and policymaking, administration and 
routines play a significant role with regard to public policy. At different levels of 
administration, policy goals and means are negotiated and produced in the context of 
specific social and institutional practices. Whilst policies define corridors of action (e.g. in 
terms of goals and means), there is a margin of subjective interpretation (related to 
individual knowledge and values), and a range of factors and circumstances limit what is 
actually achieved.  
 
 Systems of land use planning, planning policies and practices 
According to Nadin and Stead (2008), two main approaches can be used to classify spatial 
planning systems. The first starts with a classification of the legal and administrative 
structures within which planning operates, while the second applies a wider set of criteria to 
identify ideal types of planning. The former makes an essential distinction between 
regulatory planning systems that use zoning to classify and qualify the permissibility of land 
uses (e.g. Portugal and Denmark, in line with most Continental European systems) as 
opposed to discretionary systems in which plans only have indicative force, (e.g. England, 
where decisions are determined case by case). In both cases, the public sector owns the 
development rights independently of any private ownership of land, and every development 
must obtain planning permission.  
 
In England, planning permissions are determined on a case by case basis: decisions are taken 
in accordance with the local development plan unless other material considerations indicate 
otherwise (Sheppard & Ritchie 2016). Local planning authorities may enter into site by site 
negotiations with developers or landowners regarding the conditions for the granting of 
planning permission. Developers may be asked to provide necessary, relevant and 
reasonable contributions for infrastructure in several ways. For example, in areas of high 
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housing shortage, the vast majority of the contributions required are expected to be in the 
form of onsite provision of affordable housing. The National Planning Policy Framework 
(MHCLG 2018) determines that: “Where a need for affordable housing is identified, planning 
policies should specify the type of affordable housing required and expect it to be met on-
site unless: i) off-site provision or an appropriate financial contribution in lieu can be robustly 
justified; and ii) the agreed approach contributes to the objective of creating mixed and 
balanced communities” (MHCLG 2018: 17) (for more details, see section 3.1). 
 
The second approach to classifying planning systems uses a wider set of criteria, looking at 
the scope of the planning system in terms of policy topics covered, or the distribution of 
powers among levels of government (national, regional, local). In a comparison of the 
systems and practices of planning across 12 European countries, Reimer et al. (2014) review 
the four main ideal types identified by the EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and 
Policies in 1997. They emphasise how the competency of planning systems to promote an 
adequate integration of land uses, actors and funding sources varies across countries. In this 
regard, it is worth noting that Denmark (as well as the Netherlands) has been classified as a 
comprehensive-integrated ideal type, where the planning system works as a cross-cutting 
coordinator and regulator of sectoral policies with spatial impact (Reimer et al. 2014; 
Buitelaar & Bregman 2016; Needham 2014; Elinbaum & Galland, 2016), whilst England and 
Portugal are classified as a land-use and a urbanism planning ideal type, respectively (see 
Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2 Ideal-types of planning & features of the systems 
 
 
 
Source: Author, based on Reimer et al. (2014) 
 
However, the English and Portuguese planning systems and cultures are quite distinct. 
Portugal uses zoning, with plans and regulations allegedly providing legal certainty (de Kam 
et al. 2014), but the reality is that, in Portugal, as in other countries, there is room for 
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discretion at the planning and development control stages. Moreover, Portugal, like other 
Mediterranean countries, is known for its lack of consistency in application of rules and 
enforcement (Giannakourou 2005), the gap between statutory plans (that classify and qualify 
the permissibility of land uses) and implementation. As a result of this, the Mediterranean 
‘city archetype’ has been described by its simultaneously compact and dispersed form, with 
considerable differences of class, culture, and a demography in which the concept of 
‘informality’ (or spontaneity of settlement) can be preponderant (De Rosa & Salvati 2015). 
 
The relationship between planning and housing, in terms of the use of regulatory planning 
mechanisms to achieve housing goals, and specifically, the inclusion of social and affordable 
housing in new developments, has also been an object of research in several international 
studies (e.g. Whitehead 2007, Calavita & Mallach 2010, de Kam et al 2014, Gurran & Bramley 
2017) that identify the use of both mandatory and voluntary planning tools. Mandatory tools 
are, for example, used when land is re-zoned for residential development, when planning 
rules are changed for particular projects, or following significant infrastructure investment. 
Voluntary tools are used as planning incentives, within the existing planning and 
development control framework, to encourage the inclusion of affordable housing as part of 
residential development.  
 
In some countries, such as England, the granting of planning permission and the provision of 
infrastructure is typically seen as a discretionary action that typically increases land values, 
with many arguing that the owner has no moral right to the full increase of land value that 
arises from planning decisions (see, for more details, House of Commons 2018). Several 
forms of land value capture have been implemented to cover part of the cost of providing 
new public infrastructure or services, namely those that are made necessary by development 
(Oxley 2004). However, in other countries this is not the case, and inclusionary housing 
zoning and other mechanisms of land value capture, as a form of wealth redistribution, are 
rarely implemented (Calavita & Mallach 2010). 
 
 Housing policies 
As illustrated in Figure 3, housing occupies a relatively weak position within systems of 
welfare when compared to domains of social policy such as social protection/security, health, 
and education. Spending also varies considerably between the three selected countries, in 
2015 a higher spending was recorded in the United Kingdom (4.7% of total social protection 
expenditure), almost double that in Denmark (2.2% of total social protection expenditure) 
and almost inexistent (0% of total social protection expenditure) in Portugal. 
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It is worth noting that in, 2011, in a state of near bankruptcy, Portugal acceded to a 
programme of economic and financial adjustment applied by the Troika (the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), in which 
Portugal received a loan of 78bn Euros, but agreed to a memorandum of understanding with 
creditors to implement a package of austerity measures which included the reduction of 
investment in the housing sector and liberalization of the private rental sector in 2012 (Alves 
& Branco 2019).  
 
Figure 3 Social protection expenditure, by function (%) in 2015 
 
Table 5 shows the tenure structure of housing markets in the three countries and their 
capital cities. It is interesting to note the more even balance between rental and ownership in 
the capital cities than in the countries as a whole, as a result of path-dependencies, like the 
introduction of the right to buy in England, or the continuing priority of supporting home 
ownership in Portugal (see Annex 1). As the result, the rented sector varies considerably 
across countries, ranging from 20% in Portugal, 37% in England, to 42% in Denmark. 
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Table 5 Tenure structure of housing markets (in percentage of total dwelling stock) 
 Owner 
occupied 
Private 
renting 
Social 
housing 
Other 
situation 
England 
(2015) 
63% 20% 17% 0% 
London 
metropolitan 
50% 26% 24% 0% 
Portugal 73% 18% 2% 0% 
Lisbon  
metropolitan 
67% 24% 3% 6% 
Lisbon 
(municipality) 
52% 35% 6% 7% 
Source: INE (2011), GLA (2017) 
 
 Owner 
occupied 
Private 
renting 
Housing 
societies 
(andels) 
Non-profit 
building 
societies 
 
Others 
(Occupied by 
the tenant) 
Denmark 57% 17% 6% 17% 3% 
Region 
Copenhagen 
45% 14% 14% 22% 5% 
Copenhagen  
(municipality) 
22% 21% 31% 19% 7% 
Source: Statistics Denmark (2019) 
 
Statistical data also shows that there is no direct relationship between the proportion of 
homeowners and the economic prosperity of a country (measured by GDP per capita). 
Furthermore, government policy, in terms of tax (e.g. in respect to owner occupation or the 
private rented sector), subsidy (e.g. income benefits for private tenants), and regulation, are 
important explanatory factors that modify tenure preference or the capacity to access the 
different tenures. 
 
Kemeny (1995) explains the long structuration of rental sectors using reasons related to 
ideology and power relations, distinguishing between two typologies of housing models: 
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i) Integrated rental model 
The state encourages cost rental housing to compete directly with the private 
rented sector in order to dampen rents and to provide good-quality housing on 
secure tenancy terms. The model aims at a large stock of good quality housing that 
is not targeted by income limits, in which rental is considered a good alternative to 
owner occupation. Denmark is a good illustration of the effects of such 
‘structuration’ upon the size, rent levels, housing quality and tenant composition of 
the not for profit and for profit rental markets that show a balanced distribution in 
this country; 
ii) Dualist rental model 
The state takes upon itself direct responsibility for providing a social housing sector 
reserved for the poorest segments of the population. 
The size and social composition of the social and not for profit housing sectors across 
countries reflects the (different) goals and means adopted in their (long) structuration. 
Whereas the size of the social housing sector is quite different in England and Portugal, 
statistical data depicts a dualist rental market regime in both cases. In England, the 
proportion of households in the social rented sector represents 17% (of which 10% is owned 
by housing associations and 7% by local authorities), but, in the 1980s, before the 
implementation of the Right to Buy (which gave council tenants the opportunity to purchase 
their home at discounts up to 60%), the size of the municipal rented stock was equivalent to 
30% of all dwellings (for more details, see Pattison and Cole, 2019). The share of the social 
rented sector in Portugal is residual, equivalent to only 2% of all housing stock, but the Right 
to Buy has nevertheless been implemented. In England, the Right to Buy was often exercised 
by more affluent tenants, leading to the residualisation of the social housing sector which is 
now more confined to the poorest and most vulnerable. 
 
In Denmark, the state and municipalities give subsidies for the construction of new, not for 
profit housing (10% municipal capital, guarantees on mortgages loans, and individual 
housing benefits for low income families) but not to facilitate management and running 
costs. The rent of the dwellings reflects the cost of land, building and management. Housing 
associations must adopt a mandatory long term maintenance plan (10 to 30 years), financed 
through rent payments.  
 Social and affordable housing: main definitions, providers, and levels of housing 
affordability  
Understanding the concepts of ‘social housing’ and ‘affordable housing’ is increasingly 
complex owing to the use of new models of finance, methods of rent setting, and types of 
provider. The following table, based on Czischke & van Bortel (2018), Alves & Andersen 
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(2019), and Murphy & Baxter (2017) aims to identify the main meanings and features of 
‘social housing’ in each country. 
 
Table 6 The meanings and features of social and cost-housing in England, Portugal and 
Denmark  
 
Social housing  England  Portugal  Denmark 
Definition and 
target groups 
Rental housing for people on low 
incomes and for those with 
(defined) special needs. Normally 
funded through grant subsidy, 
they will remain affordable in 
perpetuity, except of they are sold 
through the Right-to-Buy 
Rental cost-housing not 
restricted to incomes. In 
general, dwellings are 
allocated to people according 
to time spent on the waiting 
list. Local governments have 
the right to assign people in 
acute need of housing (up to 
35% of vacant dwellings in 
Copenhagen) 
Rent-setting  Rents are set locally and 
determined by several 
characteristics, such as local wages 
and cost of rented 
accommodation. In England, rents 
are also adjusted by the number of 
bedrooms in a property 
Rents are set according to the 
cost of producing and running 
the housing units 
Providers (owned 
by) 
Local authorities 
and non-profit 
private 
registered 
providers (e.g. 
housing 
associations) 
 
Local authorities 
and their 
housing 
companies. The 
state (IHRU) still 
manages 
housing stock 
Housing associations build 
only for rent (commercial 
purposes and cross-subsiding 
is not allowed)  
Source: Author. Adapted from: Czischke & van Bortel (2018), Alves & Andersen (2019), 
Murphy & Baxter (2017) 
 
In England, social rents are offered by councils and housing associations, and are generally 
set at 40-65% of market rent. There are currently 1,775 housing associations managing 2.4 
million homes, with the smallest housing associations controlling fewer than 10 homes and 
the largest around 140,000. This is an independent private and not for profit sector, which 
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means that surpluses made in some activities (builds for sale or to rent) must be reinvested 
to cross-subsidise sub-market rental housing. A similar strategy has been adopted by local 
authorities, as explained below: 
 
On our (public) land, when we have the capital, we put forward a scheme to 
develop new homes. A normal default position would be to build council 
housing, and there are ways in which we can make our capital go further by 
[blending homes] for sale on the market. (…) If we build mostly council 
housing, but also some housing for sale on this land, we can extract the value 
that is inherent in the land and cross-subsidise another site. Therefore, you end 
up over the whole programme with more social housing, because some of it is 
market or intermediate, which is providing more cross-subsidy to gear up and 
make available to the overall programme. LA1. 
 
Housing associations frequently enter into contracts with central government departments 
to assist them with money or land so that they can develop new homes (or rehabilitate old 
housing stock) without having to charge exorbitant rents.  
 
Social rents in England are based on a formula set by the government. This calculates a rent 
for each property based on the relative value of the property, relative local income levels, 
and the size of the property. According to the UK government, the aim of this formulaic 
approach is to ensure that similar rents are paid for similar social properties (DCLG 2014: 4). 
The shift in England from the traditional means of subsidizing development through capital 
grants and public sector loans to a mix of private-public funding based on lower capital 
grants and loan finance sourced from the private sector, has led to the commercialization of 
the sector. The reduction of government subsidies in the form of initial capital at the time of 
development to reduce building and acquisition costs (which now have to be met through 
loan finance), has gone hand in hand with the introduction of ‘Affordable Rents’. Properties 
are let at higher rents, and housing allowances (a means-tested subsidy also known as 
‘housing benefits’) help families pay higher rents, so that private register providers are able 
to meet loan repayments, interest on capital, stock maintenance, etc. (Reeves 2014: 122).  
 
In the National Planning Policy Framework (MHCLG 2018) the concept of ‘affordable housing 
for rent’ is now defined as housing that meets all of the following conditions:  
 
(a) the rent is set in accordance with the Government’s policy for Social Rent or 
Affordable Rent, or is at least 20% below local market rents (including service charges 
where applicable);  
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(b) the landlord is a registered provider, except where it is included as part of a Build 
to Rent scheme; and  
(c) it includes provisions to remain at an affordable price for future eligible 
households, or for the subsidy to be recycled for alternative affordable housing 
provision. It includes also intermediate rents, such as shared ownership, at a price 
equivalent to at least 20% below local market value (MHCLG 2018). 
 
The literature on the financialisation of housing has emphasised that, in the context of the 
reduction of capital grants, the role of housing associations in England has changed, with the 
contradictions between social and commercial purposes being emphasised by Crook & 
Kemp (2019): 
 
”The traditional mission of housing associations in England is to provide non-
profit housing let at sub-market rents to low-income and disadvantaged 
households. And yet in recent years, large ‘property developer housing 
associations’ have begun to invest in for-profit private rental homes let at 
market rents. Despite long waiting lists for their accommodation, these housing 
associations are mainly letting their for-profit rental homes to middle-income 
tenants rather than their traditional low-income clientele.” (Idem: 666)  
 
The introduction of housing allowances has also enabled the state to relax post-war rent 
controls in the private rented sector (allegedly) without jeopardising housing affordability for 
households facing rent increases (Turner & Elsinga 2005). However, the introduction of the 
Housing Act 1988, which deregulated all new private lettings from January 1989, led to the 
dramatic growth of the rented sector (the proportion of households renting from private 
landlords rose from 9% in 1991 to 16% in 2009/10 - see Figure 4 below), and with it of public 
spending with housing allowances. Rather than reintroducing a cap on rent increases, the 
government chose to introduce a cap on housing allowances, which now limits what low to 
middle income householders can actually afford. The sector is now characterised by limited 
security of tenure relative to social housing, and in areas of short supply and high demand 
by a ‘power imbalance’ which operates in favour of the landlord (for example, landlords can 
easily end a tenancy and choose another tenant). 
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Figure 4 Housing tenures: trends in England (1918–2010) 
 
Fonte: Pearce and Vine (2014) 
 
In Portugal, the enactment of a new Urban Lease Act Law in 2012 introduced major rent 
decontrol in the private rented sector, broadening the conditions under which open 
residential leases can be renegotiated and phasing out rent control mechanisms. Whilst the 
law states that housing benefits should be implemented for families with economic needs, 
these have never been operationalised. In 2018, the Government preferred to introduce 
legislative changes to the urban leasing regime in order to protect vulnerable seniors (for 
more details, see Azevedo et al. 2019). In the social housing sector, subsidies have been 
channelled directly to the housing companies, which are owned and managed by local 
authorities or their arm’s length companies. The overall stock of only 120,000 social housing 
units (2% of all housing) in a country with relatively high levels of inequality and poverty 
explains the permanence of poor housing conditions for many, and especially for vulnerable 
communities (e.g. the Roma). 
 
Meanwhile, the concept of ‘social rent’ has been legally replaced by the concept of ‘renda 
apoiada’ (supported rent), the calculation of which is based on the size and income level of 
the household and the definition of a minimum and a maximum rent. Whereas the minimum 
rent cannot be less than 1% of the index of social support defined by the government, the 
maximum rent is based on the value of a ‘renda condicionada’ (determined by the capital 
value of the dwelling, and an effort rate, in the form of the ratio of housing expenditure 
relative to income (23% in 2019). The application of the concept of ‘renda condicionada’ to 
dwellings owned by public entities (central state, local authorities and their housing 
companies) has enabled the diversification of new supply towards mid-market rents, paving 
the way for the introduction of ‘affordable rents’ (renda acessível).  
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Several studies have emphasised that Denmark is unusual among European countries in 
terms of: i) ‘the preservation of the balance between rental and owner-occupancy, with only 
50% of all Danes living in owner-occupied housing in 2017’ (Alves 2019); ii) ‘continuous 
investment in supply subsidies to non-profit housing which remain an important part of the 
government spending.’ (Alves & Burgess 2018); iii) ‘rent control, as the national rent 
deregulation enacted in 1991 was limited to new buildings (…)’. Thus, ‘pre-1991 units are still 
subject to strong rent regulation and all types of rental housing are also subject to local 
regulations in some areas.’ (Whitehead et al. 2016: 10). In Denmark, models of finance have 
been quite stable over time, and are characterised by the cost-related principle that Alves & 
Andersen (2019) describe as rents set according to the cost of producing and running the 
housing units. The sector is financed by mortgages on market terms (covering 88% of the 
construction costs, including land), by local government subsidy, at 10% of construction 
costs (the building cost upper limit being regulated annually), and 2% by tenants. Low-
income households are entitled to housing benefit.  
 
As Table 6 shows, in both Portugal and England, access to social housing is means-tested 
and restricted to families with high levels of ‘social need’. The national government provides 
the financial regulations and generic guidelines, the local authorities, housing associations, 
or housing companies take responsibility for providing the land and the planning and 
implementation. Yet, in Portugal, the non-profit housing sector is practically non-existent, as 
a consequence of political choices made in the past. From the 1980s until the end of the 
1990s, the cooperative housing sector benefited from very favourable conditions (cheap 
land, fiscal and financial benefits), but because it used a system of individual ownership 
rather than collective ownership (cooperative tenancy, in which cooperatives rent out the 
dwellings). Once built, the dwellings were transferred through contracts of purchase and sale 
to the households, who after payment of the loans contracted with the banks were able to 
sell them without cap limits in the free housing market. 
  
The current situation in Portugal, as in other southern European countries, is described by 
Azevedo et al. (2016) as being characterised by i) high rates of home-ownership across all 
social strata; ii) high rates of second homes; iii) deficient rental markets and social housing 
stock (one of the lowest rates in Europe equivalent to 2%); iv) the role of the family in 
housing provision and self-provision, and v) high mortgage over-indebtedness. The latter 
resulted from the availability and accessibility of mortgages from the 1990s onwards and the 
government’s priority for homeownership, with subsidised loans and tax subsidies pushing 
families into owner-occupation. 
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 Housing affordability - Normative definitions and methods for measuring  
According to Tunstall & Pleace (2018): “Social renting is the cheapest of all the tenures, with 
a mean weekly rent of £95 for council tenants and £106 for housing association renters in 
2015-16, compared to £184 a week for private renters and £159 a week for the average 
mortgage payment. In 2015-16, social renters spent an average of 28% of their income on 
rent, compared to 18% for those buying their home with a mortgage, and 35% for private 
renters’. The authors also point out that 44% of people living in socially rented 
accommodation were living in poverty after meeting their housing costs and despite their 
low rents, but that poverty amongst social tenants is less widespread and less severe than it 
would be if the current population living in social housing were privately renting, due to 
relatively lower housing costs. 
 
Statistical data on housing affordability, measured by the relationship between housing costs 
and household income, enables the identification of other interesting trends (see below). To 
begin with, it is important to note that the ratio (or standard) that denotes affordability is far 
from universally accepted and that it also poses questions about which costs should be 
included (e.g. whether to consider utility bills, and costs related to regular maintenance and 
structural insurance). For example, whilst Murphy & Baxter (2017) and the housing charity 
Shelter claim that the ratio standard of 35% is the most appropriate to measure housing 
affordability, Eurostat uses the ratio standard of 40%, defining the indicator ‘housing cost 
overburden rate’ populations living in households where the total cost of housing accounts 
for over 40% of equivalised disposable income.  
 
Figures 5 and 6 are based on EU statistics on income and living conditions (EU-SILC 2019). 
Figure 5 shows the housing cost overburden rate by tenure status from 2010-2017 in 
Portugal and England, and Figure 6 shows the comparison between Portugal and Denmark.  
 
Graphs show that, on average, affordability is more of a problem among tenants than among 
owner-occupiers, and particularly among tenants who live in the private rented sector. 
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Figure 5 Housing cost overburden rate by tenure status from 2010-2017 in Portugal 
and United Kingdom 
 
A - Owner, with mortgage or loan B - Owner, no outstanding mortgage or 
housing loan 
 
 
  
C - Tenant, rent at market price D - Tenant, rent at reduced price or free 
  
  
Source: EU-SILC (2019)  
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Figure 6 Housing cost overburden rate by tenure status, 2012 (% of population)  
 
Source: Eurostat 2014 
 
In Portugal and the United Kingdom (as there is no statistical data specifically for England, 
the aggregated UK level is used here), the proportion of the population for which housing 
costs exceeded 40% of disposable income is highest for tenants with market price rents 
(owing to the liberalisation of the rental market), and lowest for those in owner-occupied 
dwellings without a loan or mortgage. In both countries, owner-occupancy offers 
significantly fewer problems of affordability than the private rental sector. Active support for 
the sector over time, both by subsidised mortgages, tax relief on mortgage interest, 
discounted sales of council housing, and exemptions from capital gains tax, may explain the 
situation. 
 
In 2017, 39% of tenants in the private rented sector in the United Kingdom spent more than 
40% of their disposable income on housing costs, whilst in Portugal this was 28%. Tenants 
with rent at below-market prices in the United Kingdom also faced affordability issues: 20% 
of tenants with reduced rents in the United Kingdom spent more than 40% of their 
disposable income on housing costs. In Portugal, only a residual percentage of 5% 
experienced housing cost overburden.  
 
In Denmark, around 50% of the tenants who pay a so-called ‘reduced price/fee’ (usually 
associated with non-profit housing), paid rents that exceed 40% of their disposable income, 
which shows unequivocal signs of growing unaffordability in the sector. In Denmark, the 
stock of pre-1990 contracts has been more regulated, playing an important role in providing 
more affordable rents. 
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 Views on housing affordability and the funding/building model 
This section summarises the qualitative evidence gathered from the interviewees between 
January and July 2019. The interviews touched on a very wide number of issues, but the 
analysis in this section is centred on interviewees’ views and experiences in response to the 
following two questions: 
  
i) Are there sufficient choices for low-income families in Lisbon/London/Copenhagen?  
ii) What has changed over the last decade in terms of funding or strategies for the 
delivery of affordable housing for low-income families?  
 
The section, which presents the views and experiences of individuals, relies heavily on 
verbatim quotes from respondents to illustrate pertinent points and specific issues. 
 
London  
Many interviewees made the point that London is a global city of eight million people with 
intensifying demand-side pressures, and characterised by insufficient choice, both in terms of 
the type and tenure of housing options. One interviewee said: 
 
We're not building nearly enough family homes, and we've also got a problem 
that a lot of the larger homes in the owner-occupied sector are occupied by 
people who haven't got children. So, there's a real problem of massive under-
occupation in most of the owner-occupied stock in London. A2  
 
Interviewees claimed that the reduction of supply subsidy mechanisms, deregulation of the 
private rental sector and the introduction of caps on housing allowances have made housing 
unaffordable for low and middle income families, forcing many to seek accommodation out 
of London. They pointed out that population growth is increasing at a faster rate than new 
housing output, and that the housing and job market in London is very internationalised, 
with foreign investors further pushing up property values. The problem is recognised by both 
representatives of local authorities (LA) and the national government (NA): 
 
Housing on the private market – on the open market – in London is very 
expensive relative to people's incomes… For young people in professional jobs 
20 or 30 years ago, when I was first working, it would be quite normal for an 
individual, and certainly for a couple, to be able to find affordable 
accommodation by buying it with a mortgage. This has become extremely 
difficult due to a number of factors. So more and more people would need to 
find other options. Of course, a lot of people would be forced to live in smaller, 
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not so good accommodation in less accessible locations. So they would end up 
living somewhere further out of London in small or shared accommodation on 
the private market. LA1 
 
A lot of the local housing allowance freezes and policies that came in … 
effectively meant that more and more low-income families were being 
squeezed out of London and having to move to different areas. NA1 
 
So the empirics are households that pay the highest proportion of their 
household income on housing costs in London of any place in England. I think 
the national average is something like 37% of income before housing benefit is 
spent on housing cost, it is much higher than that in London. The affordability 
ratio, so the ratio of prices to incomes – if you pick a borough like Kensington 
and Chelsea, it’s 20 or 30 or 40 times income compared to a national average 
of eight, I think. So clearly that means households are constrained by their 
budget in options. That’s the sort of price mechanism. NA2 
 
Representatives of non-profit housing associations mentioned that even though London 
provides a broad range of affordable housing options, namely the three regimes of 
affordable housing set by the Mayor (the London Affordable Rent, the London Living Rent 
and the London Shared Ownership), only the London Affordable Rent, where rent prices are 
linked to local wages rather than house prices, is considered affordable for low income 
renters: 
 
The only really affordable option for low income households is social housing. 
Social rents in London are around 50–60% of the market equivalent, so they 
are far better suited to those on low incomes. They are also limited in how 
much they can be increased each year: from 2020 this is capped at CPI+1%. 
Social rents are also not subject to the LHA cap, meaning that those without 
incomes can have their full rent covered. However, the lack of development of 
social housing units over the last 3 decades has meant that there are few 
properties available and waiting lists are very long. This has resulted in more 
low income families being trapped in the private rent sector. NP5 
 
Private rents in London are extremely high relative to what low income 
households can afford. In some areas of central London, average monthly rents 
exceed full-time earnings on the minimum wage. For a minimum wage worker, 
renting one of the cheapest rooms in most areas of London can easily take up 
half their pre-tax salary. For those with children, renting an entire flat would be 
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essentially impossible without support from Housing Benefit or Universal 
Credit. However, the amount of welfare one can receive to help with private 
rents is capped by the “Local Housing Allowance” rate (LHA cap). This depends 
on area and the number of bedrooms a household needs, but it was capped at 
the bottom third of local private rents and frozen in 2016, meaning it has failed 
to keep up with rent inflation. NP5 
 
I think there are three markets (of affordable housing). There’s the social rent, 
which is the London Affordable Rent, then there’s a sort of intermediate market 
for those people that want to rent, but can’t afford private rental. So there’s 
intermediate rented homes, but there aren’t many of them. Then there’s private 
rent, and then for those people that want to buy, especially in London, but can’t 
afford to buy, there’s shared ownership. NP3 
 
There was general agreement amongst interviewees that rents were increasing in the private 
sector without any improvement in quality or security of tenure, whilst the supply of social 
rented homes was reducing, and that, while house prices have increased quickly, the housing 
supply has expanded slowly, constrained by a shortage of available land for sale.  
 
Interviewees also mentioned that housing associations have adopted higher rents and a 
cross-subsidy model that uses sales of private homes to fund the provision of affordable 
housing: 
 
So, as a housing association, we do put in a lot of subsidies… we reinvest our 
profits in schemes to make them viable. But we're also quite reliant on … 
funding from the mayor, which typically means we therefore have to provide 
the affordable housing products that he makes grant funding available for. So 
that will be London affordable rent, which typically … is charged at slightly 
higher than social or target rents for one  and two bed units. NP1 
 
Lisbon 
Interviewees in Lisbon claimed that the lack of housing choices was not restricted to low 
income families. Some interviewees claimed that they had already solved the problem in the 
social housing sector, but the problem had shifted to middle class families of lower means – 
families who do not have access to social rent (due to a lack of available options and non-
qualifying income levels), and who cannot find affordable housing in the market either: 
 
The big problem, in my view, is the lack of housing for lower to middle classes. 
RP3 
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I think there is a serious problem of a lack of housing choices not only for low 
income people, but also for middle class people in Lisbon. The problem is not 
limited to low income people! RP7 
 
No, there's no choice. We are currently facing a situation of absolute 
exhaustion of supply. There isn't one. NAP1 
 
Housing policies in Lisbon have been formulated to respond to emergency 
situations, illegal settlements, shanties. That is, public housing is made to 
respond to an emergency situation. RP1 
 
Some interviewees described the situation as increasingly problematic. A combination of 
changes in housing policies and wider macroeconomic circumstances (see below), including 
new laws that liberalise the private rental market (e.g. allowing the renegotiation of all pre-
1990 lease contracts with exception of those held by seniors and disabled tenants), in a 
period of unprecedented pressure from tourism and financialisation, have exposed existing 
tenants to various forms of displacement: 
 
Unlike other countries and capitals in Europe, we have been in demographic 
recession. That is, there is no demographic growth and, therefore, new 
construction makes no sense. Moreover, the 2007–2008 financial crisis and all 
that happened afterwards - the problem of high public debt in Portugal, the 
Troika and all its effects in the period 2011–2014 - led in practice to the almost 
complete destruction of our construction sector. In practice, urban expansion 
has stopped. There has been no new construction. There was then the concern 
to turn the focus to rehabilitation and rental, far from imagining the 
phenomenon that would follow: tourism. [...] At that time, prices fell in such a 
way that, suddenly, our historic centres, especially Lisbon and Porto, have 
become loin meat for foreign investment.  NAP1 
 
Interviewees also claimed that the creation of a favourable tax regime for non-residents and 
of a Golden Visa programme, which offers residency for third country nationals when they 
buy expensive houses, has had an impact on the housing market. This has been especially 
the case in a context of the adoption of a new rental regime that has liberalised the private 
rental market, allowing the renegotiation of almost all pre-1990 lease contracts and the free 
negotiation of the new ones.  
  
Rents in the centres of Lisbon and Porto saw a period of rapid growth from 
2015 onwards, under pressure from foreign investment and tourism. RP8 
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What we have seen is increasing gentrification of Lisbon because, in fact, 
legislative change has made it easier to act on eviction or in opposition to 
contract renewal.  LM4   
 
In the context of increasing pressure from tourism, the housing market has become 
increasingly speculative in Lisbon. The increase in demand for buildings for the tourist 
market has increased property prices such that they are now much higher than can be 
afforded by an average family: 
 
At the moment, we see the brutal effects of the discovery of Lisbon by tourism 
and real estate funds…  we have actors within the city who are already much 
more powerful than the municipality itself, and who exceed their powers in a 
very responsive way. For example, house purchases and sales are packaged 
(concentration of buildings) to escape the control of tax authorities and the 
intervention of the municipality (right of preference over transactions).  RP1  
 
The problems result from a very great pressure from tourism, and owners' 
attempts to monetise their properties as much as possible. A large proportion 
of the properties were also captured by real estate investment funds, and these 
real estate investment funds have a goal of monetising to the maximum.  RP7  
 
Some interviewees explained that the demand from real estate investment funds and foreign 
buyers was diminishing the capacity of other actors seeking to provide social and affordable 
housing. At the same time, they expressed concern that this new trend could potentially 
reinforce the processes of suburbanisation observed over recent decades in Lisbon3: 
 
In the last 10 years, the thing has worsened greatly because of tourism. So until 
10 -15 years ago ... the middle classes could find a house somewhere. Now, 
with tourism, it passed to another level... in which it became really difficult to 
find a home. And if the chamber and housing services had programmes, 
although insufficient, for the lower classes, for the middle classes they did not 
have anything at all. And, therefore, there is a total and complete need. RP6  
 
There's a lot of social housing in Lisbon (municipality), but it's not enough. Of a 
total of 320,000 dwellings in Lisbon, 25,000 are owned by the City Council, but 
the Borough of Lisbon also has huge waiting lists for social housing. There are 
3,000 people waiting. NAP2  
                                                 
3 The Municipality of Lisbon lost 17% of the resident population over the period 1991–2011. 
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Copenhagen  
In answer to whether there is sufficient choice for low income people in Copenhagen, a 
representative of the local authority explained that there are not enough affordable houses 
for low income people and that it is extremely difficult to find a rent-controlled apartment: 
 
We've made a huge analysis of the availability in the housing market in 
Copenhagen, and if you are a low-income person or family, then your choice of 
housing is definitely limited. We have a wide range of housing options in 
Copenhagen, going from owner-occupied housing (only 20% of the housing 
stock in Copenhagen); 20% is public housing, and then 30% is what we call co-
op apartments, and the last 30% is rental apartments. Owner occupied housing 
has become increasingly expensive, so that's not perhaps an option if you have 
a low income… The Government, from 2001 and then the years to follow, 
liberalised the legislation regulating co-op apartments, so that also actually 
became quite expensive, and really difficult to come by. The rental market for 
housing is divided into two, basically: a type of rental apartment that is 
relatively expensive; and then a type of rental apartment that is rent-
controlled. And the rent-controlled apartments are the older apartments – they 
are taken, and it's extremely difficult to get hold of a rent-controlled 
apartment, because it's on a network basis, and you have to know the right 
people, basically. CL3 
 
Our model indicates that there's a huge need in the years to come, and the 
municipality itself has declared that they want to build 60,000 houses in the 
next twelve years … In Denmark, the inhabitants themselves feel that there's a 
lack of adequate housing, and that is especially so for the more vulnerable 
groups. RD1 
 
The idea that Copenhagen has a wide range of housing options, as just 20% of all stock is 
owner occupied, is widespread. But the reality is that most cheap or accessible housing 
options for low income people have now disappeared, and this point was emphasised by 
other interviewees. 
 
The point was illustrated with the example of cooperatives (which make up 30% of the total 
housing in Copenhagen), which emerged following the conversion of private rented 
accommodation into a collective form of cooperative ownership. Even though the strategy to 
offer renovated affordable dwellings to tenants in the 1990s led to affordable solutions (sales 
were based on low public valuations), since the 2000s, conservative governments have 
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deregulated the sector, allowing market-based assessments to determine prices (see Bruun, 
2018). 
 
A university researcher observed that house prices had risen dramatically over the last ten 
years, putting pressure on those who can least afford to move: 
 
I think that it is very difficult to get affordable housing in Copenhagen, unless 
you are well-connected or [were] already signed up for a housing association 
[since] you were born, let's say. (…) there's a social housing sector, but there's 
also a rental sector in Copenhagen. But, again, to get affordable rental flats, it 
all depends on you knowing the right kind of people. … Well, I couldn't afford 
to live in Copenhagen, for example, with my salary, as a single-earner 
household, unless I was lucky enough to find a rental place that wasn't so 
expensive; but, I mean, they're very hard to come by. RD5 
 
Other researchers said: 
 
There are still a lot of people in Copenhagen with a low income, but their 
housing possibilities are diminishing. Mainly because much of the private 
rental housing is going to be more expensive, but also because there's a lot of 
pressure on the city; a lot of people are moving to Copenhagen, coming as 
students. And earlier they moved out again when they got a family, but many 
of them are now remaining in the city and that's because there's high pressure 
on housing in Copenhagen. RD9 
 
So I would say, relatively speaking, the Copenhagen housing market is not only 
for the upper-middle and upper classes, because there is an even distribution of 
the composition of tenures (…) So I would say that there is some space for 
diversity of people on the housing market, if you are already there. But people 
moving to the city will start with private rental at a very high cost… RD2 
 
Interviewees mentioned the effect of Airbnb and also of The Blackstone Group (a US-based 
asset management fund), which has purchased a large number of old, rent controlled 
apartment buildings in Copenhagen to modernise them and subsequently raised rents.  
 
I mean, you've probably heard of the Blackstone thing? … They acquire 
apartment buildings for rents that are relatively cheap, perhaps a bit run down 
and they renovate it, they increase the rent and then they sell it off again, 
because the market value then has increased, basically. RD3 
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One reason for that is Airbnb has come to Copenhagen, and it has come in the 
last … three to four years, and it's now one of the cities in the world with a 
relatively high portion of Airbnb listings, compared to the number of dwellings. 
So people rent out their apartment for a few weeks, and they do not rent out 
one room for one year. RD1 
 
One interviewee explained that very expensive land prices in Copenhagen make it difficult to 
provide housing that is accessible for all and, over the long term, this has concentrated 
people with extremely low incomes in some areas: 
 
In some areas there's almost only social housing, but in the new development 
areas there isn't, no. So it depends on the area, I would say. (…) I think it is 
difficult, and it's more difficult in the new developing areas than it is in the 
existing ones, because the levels of rent are quite different from some of the 
older social buildings … they're much lower than the new ones. PDD3 
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 Planning for Affordable Housing: empirical results  
 
Howlett (2011) describes policy instruments as a wide range of tools or techniques of 
governance that are used at different stages of the policy process. In the field of housing 
policy, governments and local authorities have used, alone or in combination, tools, such as: 
 
i) direct transfer of capital grants for land acquisition, house building or infrastructure 
(to unlock development sites), and for low-cost financing (e.g. favourable loan 
guarantees to improve the reliability of borrowers, reducing interest payments);  
ii) indirect transfer mediated through the tax system. (e.g. the government can forego 
tax on income related to renting, and to building, or financing affordable housing);  
iii) financial penalties or tax disincentives to achieve both planning and housing 
objectives (e.g. taxation on undeveloped land to encourage house-building, or 
taxation on empty properties to rehabilitate them);  
iv) regulation - rent control and land-use regulation to limit speculative profit activities, 
e.g. rent controls, short-rentals (Cocola-Gant & Gago, 2019), land policy models 
(e.g. inclusionary zoning to require a contribution towards the supply of affordable 
housing); 
v) information and support-based tools – different forms of partnership (e.g. with 
housing associations to support delivery), and the use of knowledge and data 
available to influence consumer and producer behaviour.   
 
Whilst some governments show a preference for market tools related to deregulation and 
tax incentives, such as the Portuguese government where the use of Golden Visas (law nr. 
29/2012) and Urban Rehabilitation Areas have aimed to attract investment in real estate 
(Branco & Alves 2018); others, such as Denmark, have tended to combine taxation and 
economic redistribution in a more consistent way. The spread of privatisation in England, 
related to the reduction of the scale and scope of government, has had an impact on 
housing strategies to provide housing. The reduction of capital grants has been associated 
with a shift towards a more market-oriented mode of housing provision, in which planning 
mechanisms, such as inclusionary housing zoning, and others presented in Table 7, try to 
capture partial increases in value associated with planning permissions.  
 
The use of an ‘inclusionary planning approach’, described as one which refers to the effort of 
securing or leveraging dwelling units, land, or financial contributions towards affordable 
housing, has had a mixed reception. Whilst some see this as a planning mechanism for 
redistribution which aims to extract some of the development value created by granting 
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planning permissions (Helbrecht & Weber-Newth 2018; Granath Hansson & Lundgren 2019) 
in order to address a locally assessed ‘affordability gap’ (Gurran et al. 2018), others see it as a 
pressure mechanism set by central government to encourage local planning authorities to 
give consent to planning permissions even where proposals are not necessarily generating 
the expected qualitative results.  
 
Table 7, based on Gurran et al. (2018), shows some of the tools that have been used through 
planning systems to complement direct public instruments of delivery (e.g. capital grants and 
housing allowances). 
 
Table 7 - Key tools that have been used in planning policy/practice  
  England Denmark  Portugal 
Inclusionary 
housing  
 
 
Where 
development 
contributes 
towards supplying 
a certain 
percentage of 
affordable 
housing 
 
 
Yes. Section 106 
(S106) of the 
Town and 
Country 
Planning Act 
1990. Since 
2008, S106 has 
been 
negotiated with 
the Community 
Infrastructure 
Levy. 
Section 106 can 
follow different 
routes: on site; 
off site, or 
monetary4 
 
Yes. The 25% 
rule. 
No.   
 
Density 
bonuses 
 
Where 
development at a 
density greater 
than what is 
usually permitted 
is offered in return 
Yes ? Yes. 
Créditos de 
construção 
(building credits)  
                                                 
4 When a borough considers that a commuted sum would enable more affordable units appropriate for families 
to be provided elsewhere in the borough. Even though these ‘commuted sums’ contribute to the borough’s 
Affordable Homes Programme, they have negative impacts in relation to achieving mixed communities. 
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for an affordable 
housing 
contribution 
Planning 
concessions 
Where planning 
rules vary for 
affordable 
housing 
development or to 
enable low-cost 
market housing 
Yes ? Yes 
Negotiated 
agreements 
Where affordable 
housing 
contributions are 
negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis 
(although a policy 
framework to 
inform these 
negotiations may 
still apply) 
Yes  Yes  Yes. 
Operações de 
perequação, which 
aims for 
equalisation via 
transferable 
development 
rights and land re-
adjustment 
Impact fees Where financial 
contributions from 
developers are 
paid to offset the 
impact of a 
project on 
affordable 
housing demand 
or supply 
Yes ? Cash or in-kind 
contributions to 
mitigate the 
impacts of 
development in 
terms of 
infrastructure, not 
affordable housing 
Source: Author, based on Gurran et al (2018). 
 
In England, the inclusion of affordable housing is a material condition to make a 
development acceptable in planning terms. 
 
In our planning policies, there's a simple expectation that a private developer 
will have to deliver affordable housing, so they will have to make those 
portions of the housing available to people who will operate them at those rent 
levels. So, say a private developer has acquired an old industrial site, wants to 
build a block of flats and it's got a hundred flats in it, and we simply say to 
 37 
 
them 35 of them must be affordable. That means that the value of those flats, 
when they come to sell them, is fixed at a price that a housing association, a 
registered provider, can afford to acquire them and then rent them out, and 
sort of capitalise the value of the rent that they get. LA1. 
 
The English planning system requires local authorities to plan for projected affordable 
housing needs and negotiate affordable housing contributions from developers as a 
condition of planning approval under S106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. As 
explained by McAllister et al. (2018): “Since the early 1990s, developer contributions have 
been the main instrument for land value capture by local government in the UK.” (Idem: 316). 
Even though land value capture has varied over time in the light of shifting policy regimes 
and changing real estate market conditions, there is evidence that, in inner London, over the 
period 2005- 2017, developer contributions amounted to between 45% and 65% of land 
value, assuming a no-developer contribution regime (McAllister et al. 2018). 
 
Several interviewees explained the rationale behind the use of land value capture tools. 
 
In a kind of growing economy and where the housing market is expanding, I 
think it's reasonable to reduce the government subsidy and expect the private 
sector to pick up more of it, which is what has been seen in terms of Section 
106 being a much higher proportion of affordable housing. N1 
 
The Town and Country Planning Association has played an important role in updating the 
skills of planners in the task of planning for social and affordable housing, in order to 
facilitate the delivery of social and affordable rented housing to meet long-term need and to 
contribute to the Government’s overall housebuilding targets (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6 – Planning for affordable housing, a Town and Country Planning Association’s 
event 
 
Source: Author, adapted from TCPA (2019) 
 
The next section, based on a literature review and qualitative data collected from interviews, 
explains how the systems work and describes the related advantages and drawbacks. It 
shows what is actually delivered on the ground in terms of the mix of tenure and 
affordability, and the factors that might explain those outcomes. This is a first exploratory 
analysis of the results, other further reports (in the form of articles and book chapters) will 
follow with more definitive results. 
 
 Case study: London 
There are many studies (see Whitehead 2007, Burgess & Monk 2016, Crook et al. 2016, 
House of Commons 2018), as well as official notes and documents endorsed by local 
authorities and central government, that explain the rationale behind planning for affordable 
housing in England. This brief section analyses how planning policy in London seeks to 
maximise affordable housing provision, deliver mixed and balanced communities, and what 
has actually been achieved over the last decade. 
 How the system works 
Section 106 agreements, often referred to as planning obligations, are site-specific 
negotiations between a planning authority and an applicant, developer or other party agreed 
in order to mitigate the impacts that a development will have on its immediate locale. S106 
can be negotiated alongside the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), which was introduced 
by the Planning Act 2008 and came into force in 2010. Essentially, CIL is a locally based 
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development tax, i.e., a charge on new developments in an area designed to help fund 
associated infrastructure. It is up to each Local Planning Authority to decide whether or not 
to adopt the CIL, and, if so, at what level to set the charges. As explained by McAllister et al. 
(2018) ‘unlike S106, CIL is non-negotiable, which means that it is S106 developer 
contributions which may be reduced in circumstances where land value uplifts are small.’ 
(McAllister et al. 2018: 317). Section 106 agreements may not be used to fund the same 
infrastructure projects as the CIL. 
 
In London, the Mayor considers that planning obligations are an important tool in delivering 
good quality, affordable homes of all types, but particularly to deliver affordable housing 
accessible to those on the lowest incomes. He has emphasised that the Greater London 
Authority doesn’t have sufficient funding to build enough affordable homes, nor to invest in 
all the infrastructure that are required for boosting homebuilding, and so the GLA has to use 
governance and delivery mechanisms, such as strategic partnerships (e.g. with large housing 
associations5), or joint ventures to foster housing delivery and development6. 
 
A representative of a private developer in London, who leads a joint venture with a London 
Borough explained  
 
So we do not buy land, we enter into a partnership, which can be of different kinds with 
local authorities or housing associations. (…) In my specific project, it is a joint venture, 
50:50. It is with the council and it comprises 12 sites within the borough. Within 12 to 
15 years, it is due to double the number of affordable homes within the borough, and of 
the total 3,000 units it's 40 per cent affordable, 60 per cent private. P2 
 
A representative of a housing association in London emphasised the importance of cross-
subsiding affordable housing: 
 
In London, we have committed to a 20,000 home strategic partnership with the 
mayor and 40% of those homes will be either market sale or market rent 
                                                 
5 Such as the G15 that is made up of London’s largest housing associations The G15’s members own or manage 
more than 600,000 homes (which means that house around one in ten Londoners), and build approximately 
10,000 new homes each year. For more details on the types of homes they build and manage see: 
https://g15.london/   
6 Joint ventures are business arrangements in which two or more parties (e.g. a local authority or a housing 
company, a landowner, a housing association, a private sector company) agree to pool their resources for the 
purpose of accomplishing a specific task, for example the development of a large site which a council hasn’t got 
capacity to deliver for. 
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homes. We will make a profit on those homes and use the profit to invest in the 
other 60%, which will be genuinely affordable. NP1 
 
The table below identifies some of the key policy goals of the Mayor, who has called for 
more Government funding through a major and long-term affordable housing and 
infrastructure settlement, underpinned by fiscal devolution. 
 
Table 8 Mayor’s policy goals and means  
Greater London 
Authority/City Hall 
 
London Housing 
Strategy 2018 
GLA priorities 
operationalisation 
across five areas 
 
Programme level 
 
Policy goals 
 
London plan and 
regulations 
 
 
Securing land for new homes 
 
Support different models and 
different types of builders to 
build more homes that 
Londoners can afford  
 
Support councils in their 
functions, to ensure that their 
local housing strategies are in 
general conformity with the 
Mayor’s strategy; and that they 
have the resources and 
capacity within council 
planning and housing 
departments (e.g. the London 
authority viability group – a 
specialist team that offers 
support in viability to officers 
and member to enable greater 
levels of affordable housing to 
be provided) 
 
Reforming the private rented 
sector (The Mayor considers 
the England’s private rented 
Funding affordable investing in 
infrastructure to unlock new 
sites 
 
Encourage all councils to charge 
the empty homes Council Tax 
premium, to make leaving 
homes empty less attractive 
 
Lobbying government to allow 
councils to set this tax at a much 
higher rate, to make it more 
effective. A more progressive 
system of land taxation 
 
Radical reform of land assembly 
rules: 
 the reform of 
compulsory purchase 
powers 
 
 introduction of new land 
assembly mechanisms 
and resources 
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sector one of the worst 
regulated in Europe 
 
Ensuring that Londoners 
affected by the housing crisis 
get the help and support they 
need 
 stronger powers for City 
Hall over public land 
earmarked for new 
homes 
 
Strategic partnerships between 
GLA and the biggest and most 
ambitious housing associations 
 
Lobbying government to put a 
new model of private renting in 
place 
 
Extra resources for council 
homelessness departments 
 
Source: Author, based on official documents 
 
The Mayor of London has an annual target for the preferred tenure split of affordable homes 
on new developments, requiring that that 30% be provided at low cost rent (homes for social 
rent, or for London affordable rent), 30% at an intermediate level (London Living Rent or 
London Shared Ownership) and 40% decided locally by the planning authority.  
 
At the borough level, local planning authorities have the power to set their own local 
development plans and policies. For example, through the ‘Supplementary Planning 
Documents’ (SPD) they can set localised conditions and criteria for viability assessments and 
planning agreements (Section 106), which typically apply to major commercial (1,000 sq. m. 
or more) and residential development (10 or more units). However, local development plans 
and policies must be in general conformity with the London Plan and with the 
supplementary planning guidance that set the strategic policy framework for London. It is 
also relevant to note that in London, individual boroughs collect both the local CIL and the 
Mayor of London’s CIL, used by to fund the delivery of Crossrail. The Mayoral CIL rate is £35 
per square metre plus indexation.  
 
The Mayor has emphasised the importance of the delivery of genuinely affordable housing. 
The London Plan and the supplementary planning guidance (GLA 2016) introduced a 
threshold approach which states that schemes meeting or exceeding 35% affordable housing 
without public subsidy (or 50% where on public land without grant) can follow a ‘Fast Track 
Route’. ‘This means applicants are not required to submit viability information at the 
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application stage, and applications are subject to review mechanisms only if an agreed level 
of progress on implementation has not been achieved within two years of consent being 
granted or as agreed with the LPA.’ (idem: 14) 
 
If the applicant claims that they can't provide 35 per cent, they must follow a ‘Viability Tested 
Route’ under which applicants must submit detailed viability information which will be 
scrutinised by the GLA team for strategic applications and treated transparently (see quote 
and diagram below). Where the Mayor is not satisfied ‘with the viability information 
submitted by the applicant, the assumptions that underpin the information, or the level of 
scrutiny given by the LPA’ (GLA 2016: 12), the Mayor has the power to call in applications or 
direct refusal.  
 
As explained by an interviewee at GLA, when developers provide 35% of affordable housing 
without a grant (or 50% if the application is publicly-owned land), and meet the other 
requirements of the plan, then they don't have to submit viability, and the application 
follows a fast-tracked route:  
 
We're not going to ask any questions, just here's your planning permission, get 
on with it. If you don't achieve 35% or 50%, we are going to look at everything, 
we're going to publish everything as well, so it's all in the public domain. (…) 
The thing they hate the most - the developers - is that we also apply review 
mechanisms… (…) We're going to review your numbers halfway through 
building the scheme, and then at the end, and then in about five years' time, 
and, if any of your assumptions were wrong, we get all of the uplift. So if you 
assume sales values that were too low, for example, and in the event you made 
way more profit than you said, all of that comes back to us, and we have that 
money to spend on affordable housing. R2 
 
The importance of the Mayor's threshold approach (Figure 7) was explained by 
representatives of the non-profit housing sector as a way to cut through the 
protracted viability debates that have been slowing down the planning system, and 
to give developers more certainty as to what they will pay for land:  
 
Because they know clearly what's expected of them, which can essentially drive 
down land values. NP1  
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Figure 7 – Threshold approach to viability diagram  
 
Source: GLA (2016: 68-69) 
 
A representative of the private sector involved in the identification, acquisition and 
promotion of land through the planning system, explained that when planning obligation 
policies are included in development plans, the costs of planning obligation can be built into 
the land price in advance: 
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Sometimes we have a clause in the contract that will say we'll have a 
commitment to a minimum price, (for the sake of argument, I don't know, half 
a million pounds an acre, that sort of level, depending on where the site is), 
but, generally, all we're agreeing at that point is the percentage of what we'll 
get from it at the end of the process. So that allows for Section 106 to go up, or 
affordable housing percentages to change, as the housing market obviously 
does - ups and downs - so we just can't commit ourselves at the beginning of 
the process. P2  
 
Certainly in the area we cover, the South East, at the end of the day, the 
biggest beneficiary of an increase in land value is the landowner. So we get our 
10 per cent, which is our fee for getting planning permission, but the big hitch 
of it really is with the landowner, but if his land has gone from being worth 
£10,000 an acre to half a million pounds an acre, then he's doing all right, isn't 
he? P2 
 
The Mayor has emphasised that the threshold approach must be understood in the context 
of the Mayor’s other key tools for increasing affordable housing, which include the Mayor’s 
Affordable Homes Programme 2016-21 that supports Registered Providers to deliver 
housing programmes. To enable the delivery of more affordable housing, the Mayor makes 
funding available to increase the proportion of affordable homes over and above that which 
is available on a nil grant basis.  The SPG (GLA 2016) determines that where developer-led 
schemes can provide or exceed 40% affordable housing (with grant) then the fixed grant per 
unit will be available on all affordable housing units in the scheme. 
 
The London Plan, which is a schematic spatial model that sets out major proposals, identifies 
Opportunity Areas and Housing Zones as areas of intensification where developers can build 
at higher density. However, as these areas are often areas that require significant investment 
in infrastructure, for example public transportation, schools, social infrastructure, health 
facilities, etc., the borough can ‘red line’ them in their local plan and apply a higher CIL rate 
in order to secure future tax revenues for investment in local infrastructure.  
 
For example, in anticipation of the London Underground Bakerloo Line extension in the Old 
Kent Road area, the Borough of Southwark reviewed its CIL charging schedule, and set out 
that all future planning permissions in the area should pay a (higher) rate of £218 per square 
metre, in order to make contributions for archaeology, transport, open space improvements. 
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 General Views  
There is a general acceptance of the importance of planning obligations for the provision of 
a proportion of social and affordable housing as a condition of planning permission. Local 
councils in England rely substantially upon the planning system to enable them to build new 
affordable homes (Lord et al., 2018), but negotiations between local authorities and 
developers with regard S106 vary substantially between regions and over time. They are 
typically reduced during periods of economic recession, and in areas of low demand. They 
are also shaped by place-specific conditions (for more details, see Lord et al. 2018).  
 
Interviewees claimed that ‘the use of S106 has become the norm’ and ‘the policy that is now 
in operation with good results’. Interviewees explained that in areas of high demand, S106 
agreements are very important as a means of reducing the cost of land for development and 
building new properties,  
 
With Section 106, the developer agrees to build and sell a certain number of 
their homes at a huge discount to a housing association or registered social 
provider. N1. 
 
Interviewees identified some negative outcomes associated with the use of S106, including 
general costs and delays involved in S106 negotiation. They noted that ‘land-use planning 
negotiations are slowing down housing building’ (N1, A4).  
 
They also expressed the view that increased government funding is needed to unlock sites 
and housing provision, and that local authorities needed to play a more proactive role in 
land pooling and development, especially in cities where land is expensive and hard to buy. 
 
Occasionally, we have used things like developing mechanisms, like 
development corporations to mobilise land, and so it would be worth 
considering the experience of the London Docklands Development Corporation; 
because, undoubtedly, that was responsible for bringing a lot of new housing 
into development. But, in general, we tend to rely on the private market, on 
developers, if you like, many of whom are only interested in getting permission 
and then selling the land on to house builders. A1 
 Views of interviewees regarding Section 106 
Since 2010, as a result of reduced government grants for building affordable housing and 
the Mayor’s official assessment that London needs 66,000 new homes per year, planning 
obligations have become an essential means by which to extract funds and manage public 
sector infrastructure and facilities in London.  
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Planning obligations are legally binding agreements between local planning authorities and 
developers of the land, to make the proposed development acceptable in planning terms. 
S106 agreements, which have been the primary form of land value capture in England have 
been typically locally determined and negotiated on a site by site basis, according to the 
nature and size of the development (McAllister et al. 2018).  
 
The reasons for planning obligations, have been discussed in the literature (see, for example, 
Campbell et al. 2000, McAllister 2019), and include the need to shift costs from the general 
tax payer to the beneficiaries of the new facilities, the need to capture some of the value that 
arises from the granting of planning permission and the need to contribute to the provision 
of social and affordable housing.  
 
As a precondition of planning permission, developers must generally make a contribution ‘in 
kind’ by selling a proportion of dwellings to registered not for profit housing associations or 
registered providers of non-market housing at a discounted price. In other cases, developers 
may offer a sum of money to the local authority in lieu of providing affordable housing 
(Oxley 2004). 
 
The London Plan sets out the Mayor’s expectation that around two thirds of new homes 
should be affordable without the need for subsidies; the Mayor has also secured £4.8bn 
funding from the Government to help housing associations, community groups, London 
boroughs and private developers to build new affordable homes. The target of the 
Affordable Homes Programme 2016–21 is to commence building at least 116,000 affordable 
homes by March 2022. 
 
While planning policies require a specific minimum percentage of affordable housing, the 
empirical evidence shows that the expected numbers often do not materialise. It is also the 
case that, when affordable housing is delivered as part of a residential development, it is too 
frequently in the form of shared ownership rather than social rent, as the former is the tenure 
preferred by developers. However, Murphy and Baxter (2017) provide empirical evidence in 
support of this: “There is an array of affordable housing and subsidised housing products 
available for people on a range of incomes within London. Social rent and London Affordable 
Rent (at the new benchmark rent levels set by the Mayor) are the only products that serve 
those on the lowest incomes across the capital.” 
 
Evidence also shows that developers often ask to renegotiate S106 contributions towards 
affordable housing on the grounds of viability, responding to site and scheme specific 
circumstances or changes in the wider housing market. CIL cannot be negotiated. Since 2012, 
negotiations on the grounds of economic viability have been used by developers to claim 
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that the council’s planning policy requirements relating to affordable housing compromised 
the economic viability of the development. Developers have used this argument to justify 
much lower levels of affordable housing than local targets would suggest (R3, NP3). 
 
Since 2018, the new national guidance very clearly states that the price paid for land should 
not be used as an input into a viability assessment. Particularly in London, the Mayor expects 
that, when bidding for land, developers should take into account the planning obligations. It 
has been emphasised that developers should not buy sites that fail to reflect wider 
community responsibilities, in order to avoid leading to what Wacher (2018) describes as ‘the 
circularity problem’. As explained by a representative of the Greater London Authority: where 
the price of land is bid up, the affordability consequentially drops, which encourages 
developers to overpay for sites and try to recover some or all of this overpayment via 
reductions in planning obligations (see, for more details, LBDVP 2016). 
 
The section below focuses on the views of interviewees with regard to the practice of 
financing the supply of affordable housing through S106. It also looks at whether the 
implementation of this policy has succeeded or failed in terms of targets and policy 
objectives, namely the provision of affordable housing for low income families, and the 
fostering of mixed and balanced communities.  
 Genealogy and views on S106 agreements  
As said before, Section 106 agreements, also known as ‘planning obligations’, are 
agreements made between local authorities and developers that can be attached to a 
planning permission. They are used to mitigate the effects of planning permission and help 
to fund infrastructure and the provision of social and affordable housing. Interviewees 
working at London boroughs explained how it works in practice:  
 
A person puts in a planning application for a hundred units, and 25 of those 
have to be social rented, ten of those have to be intermediate. The intermediate 
ones could be shared ownership, or intermediate ownership. They go through a 
process, and they apply for planning permission and it goes to a planning 
committee, it gets approved. They then have to sign what's called a Section 106 
Agreement, so within that Section 106 Agreement there'll be all sorts of 
paragraphs around the numbers of the units, if they're family housing or 
whatever., when they have to get built, is it on occupation or is it prior to 
occupation. There'll usually be a registered social landlord… or if it's council, 
then the council or sometimes the registered social landlords can forward it 
themselves. So it will be the housing will be secured in perpetuity for whoever 
has it now, or whoever buys it from them, that's how it works. LA2 
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So we have private developers who bring forward schemes, and we require 
them to deliver affordable housing as part of that. We have also … been 
gearing up to produce more housing of our own, so we're finding ways to build 
our council housing. So we've got funding and some of that comes from 
Section 106, some of it comes from using the proceeds of the right to buy sales, 
because when somebody exercises the right to buy they do actually pay us a 
discounted amount of money, and that money, over the course of a year, 
makes a very substantial amount of money that is then being invested into 
new homes. LA1  
 
Another interviewee, with lengthy experience in producing detailed guidance on viability 
testing and negotiating S106 agreements, recalled the history of the implementation of S106 
of the Town and Country Planning Act in England: 
 
Well, I think the history of it is that the government of the time, which was a 
Conservative government under John Major, were open to the potential for 
social housing to be delivered by the market, as well as through public funding. 
The concept in planning terms was of generating mixed and balanced 
communities, and the idea that you don't develop all your private housing in 
one part of the city, and have all the social housing somewhere else, but 
actually it's integrated within individual developments.  R3  
 
The same official claimed something that the London fieldwork confirmed: ‘There is a very 
wide consensus around the importance of Section 106’. The debate centres on the extent to 
which developers should be required to provide affordable housing and the principles 
around the notion of how to address the affordability crisis, which has worsened over recent 
years. As explained by the same interviewee, the questions raised by the affordability crisis 
include: 
 
Do you solve that crisis by deregulating planning, by reducing the 
requirements of the planning system in order to encourage a greater number 
of developments to be built? Therefore, increasing the supply of housing, which 
reduces the market value of residential properties (that was the underlying 
principle behind some of the changes that were happening from about 2012 
onwards) or by reinforcing the requirements of the planning system… as a way 
of ensuring that developments mitigated impact, but also try to achieve some 
of the broader social and sustainable objectives, and to meet housing needs. R3 
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I think what we saw during the 2000s, is that the idea that if you deregulate 
planning, that you automatically get more housing, and that that's going to be 
sufficient to then bring the market value of housing – house prices – down, 
didn't work. R3  
 
There is broad consensus among interviewees that S106 benefits the community. This is 
quite obviously manifest in London, where land is expensive for actors who wish to build 
affordable housing. The lack of money to purchase land and build houses explains why local 
councils have come to increasingly rely upon the planning system, specifically S106, in order 
to build new, affordable homes: 
 
Councils have a limit to what they can borrow, so the capacity for public 
authorities, for government to build the number of affordable homes we need 
at the minute, is not there. And so there is a heavy reliance on private 
developments to cross-subsidise affordable housing through Section 106. NP2  
 
In order to provide certainty for developers, interviewees emphasised the importance of 
producing plans and supplementary planning documents in order to clarify planning 
obligation requirements. Often supplementary planning documents include evidence of 
testing various scenarios: they examine the impact of varying the proportion of affordable 
housing on the economics of residential development. The profitability of housebuilding in 
some central boroughs was estimated to be sufficient to deliver 50% of affordable housing 
without any additional public subsidy (Oxley, 2004). 
 
As developers know the reduction of profit that planning obligations entail before 
purchasing land, they can bid less for the land, and effectively transfer some costs to the 
landowner. One of the benefits of S106 agreements, as explained by interviewees, is to 
reduce the cost of the land and enforce the building of affordable housing units. The 
developer must agree to build and sell a certain number of homes at a considerable discount 
to a housing association or registered social provider: 
 
Over the last ten, 15 years, I suppose, since the Conservatives took power, the 
only source of funding has been through cost subsidy, through what's known as 
Section 106. That is private developers have been required to provide a certain 
proportion of housing for social housing, and they argue about how much they 
can afford to provide, obviously rather hinges on the nature of the site. And the 
target has been to – as a generalisation – to get about 30 per cent, which 
happens to be the same proportion as in the Netherlands. A1 
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Interviewees identified a number of limitations of the current system. In London, the benefits 
of S106 do not favour households on lower incomes as much as those on middle incomes. 
As a consequence, the backlog of unmet needs for low rent housing has actually grown over 
time. One interviewee, who worked in a borough in London negotiating S106, explained 
how, in that municipality, they had always tried to get social and intermediate rent to target 
nurses and teachers, and tried to ensure affordability for key workers, without shared 
ownership: 
 
Section 106 is supposed to be affordable housing in perpetuity. If you do a 
shared ownership home, somebody can come in and staircase up to full 
ownership the day they move in, and then it's lost forever because they can sell 
it, on the open market at an open market value. So the developers lost their 
share of the profit and the local authorities lost the affordable use of it. LA3 
 
Negotiations between local authorities and developers with regard to S106 vary substantially 
between regions, across boroughs and over time, and are typically reduced during periods of 
economic recession. In London, the percentage of affordable housing secured through the 
planning process fell each year between 2007 and 2015 (Wacher 2018: 449). Interviewees 
explained why local authorities have not been able to achieve their social housing targets. 
One emphasised the importance of planning preparation in determining whether or not 
sufficient affordable housing would be delivered to meet local needs: 
 
The reason they don't get it is that you go through this viability piece. The 
people are paying too much for land and bill costs are too high, that you can't 
afford. … If you've paid that much for land and it's going to cost you that much 
to build it, you cannot afford to provide that level of affordable housing that 
local authorities want. NP1  
 
I think the most important is plan-making, because there needs to be a hard 
line set at that stage to even impact the later stages. If there was no policy for 
50%, 35% affordable housing, then the majority of private developers would go 
in with zero, because they don't want to provide it. NP1  
 
I think that you've got to set the rules up front … you have to focus on the right 
strategy. A1 
 
From interviewees’ answers, it is possible to conclude that: 
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i) The outcome of S106 agreements depends on the political ambitions of local 
authorities to provide social housing, and how this approach is translated into the 
planning system. In some areas, the ambition to secure a supply of housing which 
encourages mixed communities is more evident than in others, implying that 
ideology might have a role here; 
ii) S106 negotiations can be shaped by the skills, knowledge and bargaining potential 
of those involved. 
 
  What is actually is delivered on the ground in terms of the mix of tenure and 
affordability? 
This section discusses the evidence as to how much new affordable housing has been 
delivered. 
 
There is evidence that the number of affordable homes delivered through S106 is falling 
short of estimated need. There is also evidence that intermediate tenures, which require 
lower levels of subsidy and developer contributions, are replacing the provision of housing 
that is affordable to low income families. 
 
The London Assembly Housing Committee publishes the Affordable Housing Monitor, which 
looks at how many affordable homes are being built each year (Figure 8). This year's monitor 
has found that the Mayor has received £4.82bn from the UK Government to deliver 116,000 
affordable home starts by March 2022; there were 9,815 completions of GLA funded 
affordable homes between 2015/16 and 2016/17, and fewer than 5,500 homes were 
completed in the year 2017/2018. 
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Figure 8 Affordable homes completions 2008-2018 by tenure 
 
Source: London Assembly (2019) 
 
The Government’s Housing Delivery Test (2018) concluded that a number of councils are 
falling short in their delivery of housing. The Government has urged local authorities to make 
better use of S106 agreements to deliver more affordable housing and infrastructure without 
grants. 
 
In the context of a very severe shortage of housing, the Mayor and local authorities have 
prioritised the provision of social rented housing. However, statistical data on the number of 
new homes completed by tenure showed a reduction in the production of social rent units 
for low income householders (i.e. households at the bottom end of the income distribution), 
and an increase in the production of new intermediate products of affordable rent for middle 
income households. Developers are more willing to provide shared ownership units than to 
increase the number of social rented units, as this enables more affordable housing to be 
delivered with less subsidy. Housing associations, however, use shared ownership to cross-
subsidise social rented housing from the income they make when selling additional equity 
shares to shared owners. 
 
The Greater London Authority (2015), in ‘Housing in London 2015’, explained the main 
trends of the decade (see Figure 9) as follows: in London, the proportion of London 
households who owned their own home (whether outright or with a mortgage) peaked in 
the early 1990s but then fell to just under half by the time of the 2011 Census, the first time 
owner occupiers have been in the minority since the early 1980s. The private rented sector 
was once the largest tenure in London but shrank from 46% of households in 1961 to 14% in 
1991, before rapid growth brought it back up to 26% in 2011, making it the second largest 
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tenure. In contrast, social renting grew rapidly between the 1960s and 1980s, 
accommodating 35% of households in 1981, before falling to 24% in 2011. (Idem: 8) 
 
Figure 9 Trends in household tenures in London, 1961–2011 
 
Source: GLA (2015, pp. 8) 
 
As the market price of housing has risen, the need for affordable housing in London has 
increased substantially. Referring to the Mayor of London’s housing strategy, Wacher (2018: 
449) notes that the declining amount of social housing has left ‘more than a quarter of a 
million Londoners on housing registers and more than one in eight social housing tenants 
living in overcrowded conditions’. He also claims that the reduction of social housing (as the 
result of viability test assessments) has contributed to an increase in homelessness. “The 
number of people seen sleeping rough in London increased significantly between 2010/11 
and 2016/17, with an 8% reduction in 2017/18.’ (Wacher 2018: 449) 
 
 Case study: Copenhagen  
Several studies have explored the key features of the Danish housing system in terms of 
funding, allocation and rent-setting etc. (Alves & Andersen 2019, Andersen & Jensen 2019, 
Noring 2018), and concluded that the not for profit housing sector in Denmark is financed by 
the municipality, the state and residents. The municipality provides 10% of building costs in 
the form of a loan, residents provide 2% as a deposit when moving in, and the remaining 
88% of the construction costs are financed by a normal mortgage loan on market terms. In 
addition to this, the state guarantees that the total capital costs are set at 2.8% of the total 
construction costs, an amount that is increased annually according to the rate of inflation. 
The difference between the set capital costs and payments on the mortgages are covered by 
the state. Renovations and developments in the existing stock are supported by the National 
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Fund for Non-profit Housing Associations, which was established in 1966 in order to receive 
the rent payments after the mortgages that financed the building had been settled. In order 
words, when the mortgage was paid off, the rent paid by tenants contributes to savings 
lodged with the National Building Fund and co-finances major refurbishments and special 
efforts in more disadvantaged neighbourhoods. 
 
Whilst the funding mechanisms have endured over time, a distinctive feature of Denmark 
when compared to other European cases (namely the English and Portuguese cases), is that 
changes in the economic, political and social environment of the country have had 
significant impacts on the polarisation of different sections of the housing sector. Changes in 
employment, the economy and immigration have all affected housing in Copenhagen. 
 
In 1993, the municipal authority Copenhagen faced a severe crisis of employment and 
finance (almost bankruptcy). The recovery plan agreed with state authorities led to 
substantial changes in terms of regulation and investment. The city decided: 
 
i) to halt the construction of new not for profit housing (from 1995 to 2009);  
ii) to transfer municipally-owned land and housing stock to a public company that 
adopted a more entrepreneurial and business-oriented strategy in terms of 
planning and housing development (see below); and  
iii) to adopt a new regulation that required that all new dwellings (including those built 
for home ownership and cooperatives) had have a minimum size of 95 m².  
A “hybrid model of managing and financing urban development and public infrastructure” 
(Noring 2019) has been implemented in Copenhagen since that time. Firstly, the Ørestad 
Corporation used a new town concept on the island of Amager, planning the area of Ørestad 
(Figure 10) with the Copenhagen Metro as the primary public transport grid, connecting the 
area with the Øresund Railway, Copenhagen Airport, and the nearby Øresund Bridge.  
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Figure 10 Ørestad Boulevard 
 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
Secondly, the Copenhagen City and Port Development Corporation (The City & Port), a 
publicly owned but privately managed company, has also followed the new town 
development corporation model, using public land owned by the municipality and/or the 
state, and by establishing joint ventures with private investors, to conduct large scale urban 
regeneration of previous industrial and port areas since 2007. 
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Figure 11 Brygge Bridge, Copenhagen  
 
Source: Author (2019) 
 
The City & Port has a national statutory mandate to maximise revenue in order to fund large 
scale urban regeneration and city-wide infrastructure (Noring 2019; Majoor 2015). It does so 
by re-zoning, investing in infrastructure, and using land value capture in order to finance 
infrastructure investment, including the city-wide Metro system. Whilst the model has been 
successful in financing public transport improvements in the city and implementing quality 
large scale private housing developments in the waterfront areas, it has had a significant 
impact on land and housing prices. This is because the aim of this company is not to provide 
cheap or affordable land for not for profit housing associations (this is not one of its policy 
goals) but simply to maximise profits in order to fund large scale urban regeneration projects 
and city-wide infrastructure. As noted by Andersen and Jensen (2019), the strategy has been 
successful in attracting jobs and more middle class families into the city, but this has been at 
the expense of a loss of affordable housing and the creation of a more polarised city.  
 
Copenhagen is a city that is becoming increasingly divided, not in terms of housing tenure, a 
key factor shaping the social composition of neighbourhoods (as owner occupancy tends to 
be linked to middle to higher income groups, and the rented sector to a population with 
fewer economic and educational resources), but also within tenures, including a more 
polarised almene boliger sector (general, not for profit housing), between the old and new 
sections: 
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Not for profit housing goes back a century in Copenhagen, so you have old not 
for profit housing units, which are very cheap, where you pay maybe like 
3,500/4,000 Danish krones a month, for a family-sized unit. But, of course, 
they're very limited, there are not that many. And, of course, people, they don't 
move from them. RD8 
 
The municipality has access to 30 per cent of what we build in Copenhagen. So 
they can choose to put in a third of the people, people with special needs. We 
send them a list of the apartments that are available, with the rent, and then 
they can say, oh, they are too expensive for our clients, we don't want them. (…) 
They can be too expensive unless we build very, very small apartments. NPAC2 
 
To better understand this, some explanation is needed as to how the not for profit sector is 
subsidised and regulated in Denmark. This is based on Alves & Andersen (2019). In Denmark, 
rents in the not for profit sector are set according to the costs of producing and running the 
housing units. The primary rule for allocation is that vacant dwellings are allocated to people 
according to time spent on the waiting list. Waiting lists are open to anyone and are not 
restricted to income. In return for co-funding, local authorities in Copenhagen have the right 
to assign up to 33% of vacant dwellings to people in acute housing need. Families are usually 
allocated to neighbourhoods with vacant units vacated by other families. These are usually in 
neighbourhoods with predominantly lower rents, a higher concentration of households on 
lower incomes, and families with an immigrant background. The waiting lists for the most 
popular estates, including newly built estates, can be several decades.  
 
Over the last decade, the adoption of a system of flexible tenant allocation for vacant 
dwellings has aimed to constrain the flow of vulnerable households into neighbourhoods 
with a high concentration of unemployed and low income tenants (for more details, see 
Alves (2019), based on interviews carried out in 2015). As a result of this and renovation 
schemes in the city, the availability of low cost dwellings for low income families has been 
substantially reduced. 
 
More recently, the Danish Parliament passed a bill, proposed by the previous Prime Minister, 
Lars Rasmussen, to make physical changes in areas with a large concentration of public 
housing and a larger share of residents with poor connection to the labour market, lower 
education, poorer health etc. The bill, which uses the derogatory state label of ‘ghettos’, 
whilst the municipality of Copenhagen continuous to designate these as ‘disadvantaged 
areas’, requires the sale, conversion or demolition of part of the dwellings in identified areas, 
so that only 40% of housing may be allocated to almene boliger, general, not for profit 
housing. This bill allegedly aims to foster a more balanced social composition of residents. It 
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has raised objections from politicians, academics and representatives of not for profit 
housing associations. They claim that demolition or privatisation (in some cases, non-profit 
housing associations will have to sell 60 per cent of their homes, and 60 per cent of the 
families will be displaced to other homes in other neigbourhoods), will only reduce the 
availability of apartments with affordable rents in the city and move low income families 
around.  
 
The problem, number one, is that this is an extremely expensive way to solve 
problems. If you demolish buildings that actually contain okay flats, and then 
have to build new ones because you have to rehouse them, and you cannot just 
put them on the street, then it becomes so expensive for each family you move. 
RD3 
 
It's a big change that they are doing such large-scale demolishment of 
housing, but it's sort of a continuation of the discourses or policy strategies that 
have actually been going on for the last ten years, I would say. I mean, there's 
a clear continuation of the way you think about these vulnerable housing areas 
since the first ghetto package in the beginning of 2000 and onwards. RD5 
 
Below are some images of the Mjølnerparken housing project located between Nørrebro and 
Bispebjerg S-train station in Nørrebro, where approximately 2,500 people live, many of them 
from immigrant backgrounds, which was identified for transformation. 
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Figure 12 Mjølnerparken, Copenhagen  
 
Source: Author (2019) 
 How the system works 
Næss et al. (2009) describe the spatial development of Copenhagen Metropolitan Area as: ‘as 
a combination of inner-city densification and low-density outward expansion, where the 
former tendency has, during the recent decade, outweighed the latter’ (pp. 49). Between 
1999 and 2008, the absolute population and demographic density of the municipality of 
Copenhagen increased, putting an end to the long period of demographic decline between 
1950 and 1980, during which Copenhagen lost nearly 300,000 inhabitants (2/5 of its 
population).  
 
As emphasised by Elinbaum & Galland (2012), the rationale and spatial principles of the 
Finger Plan plays an important role in the spatial development of Greater Copenhagen. They 
explain that the Finger Plan is based on two fundamental spatial principles: the so-called 
‘principle of proximity’ based on the spatial logic of locating activities (such as public 
institutions, retail centres, and residential areas) in close proximity to suburban rail stations; 
and the principle of green wedges aimed at protecting and preserving green areas between 
the ‘fingers’ (for more details, see pp. 190). They also explain that the institutions in charge of 
governing Greater Copenhagen have been subject to structural shifts in terms of planning 
functions and powers. One of the challenges was the abolition of the metropolitan council of 
Greater Copenhagen, and the upward reallocation of its responsibilities to the Minister of the 
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Environment. The new spatial planning system abolished the former regions and delegated 
town planning to municipalities. Local government reforms in 2007 also reduced the number 
of municipalities (from 271 to 98) and gave municipalities more power to prepare municipal 
and local plans. They retained the general planning goal of preventing urban sprawl into 
surrounding open areas, and fostered urban development supported by the use of public 
transport and cycling. 
 
National reports from the Minister of the Environment and national planning directives are, 
however, important to set a framework and to create planning tools that local authorities can 
use (e.g. the 25% rule). The lack of a metropolitan structure or plan explains that in 
Copenhagen (as in Lisbon), territorial fragmentation exists between municipalities (e.g. 
between Copenhagen and neighbouring municipalities). As in Lisbon, local plans are 
produced by the municipalities which specifically establish what construction can take place 
(in terms of volume, density, etc.) and where, and these are updated every four years. 
The Copenhagen’s Urban Development Department (within the borough) works in close 
cooperation with the Mayor of Copenhagen on these matters. They are currently setting the 
framework for Copenhagen’s development over a 12-year planning cycle (from 2019 to 
2031).  
 
One interviewee explained that the Municipal Plan of Copenhagen 2019 will contain over 50 
different objectives for a number of statutory issues (including the Planning Act). They also 
explained that the overall goal of the Municipal Plan in terms of housing is to build 60,000 
new housing units in Copenhagen, of which 25% should be public housing (not for profit). 
The municipality recognises that demand and housing prices are rising very rapidly in 
Copenhagen, and expects that the areas that will be transformed in terms of re-zoning (e.g. 
industrial areas that now are used for the harbour and port activities and that will be 
developed for residential uses) will contribute to the goal of more housing, and housing that 
matches current demand. 
 
This was a policy goal of the Municipal Plan 2015, as stated below:  
 
We want to strengthen the social composition in Copenhagen by increasing the 
socio-economic diversity in the city’s neighbourhoods. Each neighbourhood 
should have different types of housing, forms of ownership and housing at 
various price levels that match the needs and wishes of a diverse range of 
people (Municipal Plan 2015: 27). 
 
The Municipal Plan of Copenhagen 2019, and the more detailed statutory planning 
regulating what can be built, will define an overall planning strategy that supports a mix of 
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use, transport and green infrastructure, and housing tenures and types. The key priorities in 
terms of housing are to increase housing supply (60,000 new houses) and to secure a quota 
of Danish public housing in each new development (i.e. 15,000 new houses - 25%). The 
municipality also wishes to provide 12,000 new youth housing units for students in the city.  
 
The new municipal plan also introduces a new model of housing size regulation to ensure a 
more varied supply of housing, allegedly one that ensures a balance between market-driven 
development and long term housing policy goals. The new model stipulates that no housing 
unit is to be less than 50m2. In a new development or building, 50% of the housing units are 
exempt from the regulation pertaining to average housing size, but the other 50% of 
housing units must have a minimum 95m2 on average. The rationale behind the minimum of 
50m2 rule was explained by one interviewee: 
 
I think that we see in other cities a more liberal approach to housing sizes. So 
we see some rather small housing units, and  we don't want that to be taken 
up in Copenhagen. The municipal plan also sets out the ambition that 25% of 
the housing stock in Copenhagen should be public housing. We don't really use 
the term 'social housing' in Denmark. CL3 
 
The interviewee also explained that under the new regulation, it will be possible to build 
twice as many smaller houses in urban development areas than under the current regulation, 
and even more in the existing (consolidated) city. The municipality itself anticipated that the 
average size of the 50% exempted from the requirement will be in practice approximately 
65m2. 
 
The Municipal Plan 2015 has already stated the policy goal of improving the options for 
building small and affordable houses suitable for social allocation of housing, as follows:  
 
The political agreement between the city of Copenhagen and the public 
housing organisations (2015-2018) establishes a key goal in reducing rent 
increases. An agreement has also been reached to ensure that 10% of new 
residential construction in Copenhagen’s urban development areas comprise 
smaller flats with a rent under DKK 3,200 per month. 
 What is actually delivered on the ground in terms of the mix of tenure and 
affordability? 
In new developments, the high cost of land and building has limited the construction of not 
for profit rental dwellings, as public land has not been priced at lower levels for not for profit 
housing associations. The Municipal Plan of Copenhagen in 2015 recognises the problem of 
an uneven distribution of public housing in Copenhagen: 
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Residential construction in recent times has been relatively homogeneous and 
expensive, particularly in Copenhagen’s new urban development areas. The 
vision now is to ensure that the new urban development areas are diverse and 
offer housing for many different types of people. (Copenhagen Municipality 
2015: 32) 
 
The Municipal Plan 2015 further states that, as the Danish Parliament has passed 
amendments to the Planning Act (2016), the city can now require: ‘25% public housing in 
local plans for the new housing areas and provide funding for the purchase of plots for 
public housing in the more extensive parts of Copenhagen, where the high property prices 
have previously been an obstacle to the construction of public housing. The rules cover 
public housing for families, youth, and the elderly, as well as care homes.’ (Copenhagen 
Municipality 2015: 28) 
 
Notwithstanding these goals, the implementation is far from efficacious, with interviewees 
stating that implementation of the law is dependent upon whether landowners are willing to 
sell to a public housing organisation. They noted that the new apartments built in new 
developments are not actually affordable for the most needy families. 
 
Confronted with these criticisms, representatives of the Copenhagen Municipality explained 
that only when they receive information on the actual rental price that each tenant should be 
charged (in these new developments) do they decide to use, or not use, the new apartments 
to allocate families on their emergency list (usually the most needy families). In interviews, 
they confirmed that housing allowances provided by the municipality (and which flow 
directly to the provider) are not enough to cover the rents.  
 
I: Now you have this 25% rule, but I've been told that everything that is 
produced, even by non-profit housing associations that is based on cost, in new 
developments it's still very expensive… 
R: Yes. 
I: And the local authority is not allocating the one-third that's could be 
used for social cases, because it's too expensive. Does this mean that in new 
developments you are not providing any social housing for low-income people? 
R: That's true. That's definitely the case. Now, the thing is that if you have 
- I think on average, what we're calling a public housing unit is 24%  cheaper 
than a a similar private rental apartment. So is that cheap or not? That's the 
discussion. […] the problem with these newly built apartment buildings (not-
for-profit), is that they are still too expensive if you are on a public subsidy, for 
instance.  
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Representatives of non-profit housing association, however, claimed: 
 
You have to see the situation in the long run. In the long run, we are solving 
the problems, because over time these apartments will become cheaper and 
cheaper and cheaper, and then suddenly, bam, you have that they're 
accessible. But here now, of course, they're not, so within the first ten, 15 years 
of these apartments' existence, they will be too expensive for people who are 
very challenged financially. NPAC2 
 
The only way that we can make apartments for people with very, very low 
income (maybe between DKK 3,000 and 4,000 a month, which is accessible for 
people on social pensions) is to make them very, very small. But for new 
buildings, it's very hard, and we have to make the apartments very, very small. 
That's the only way we can do it. NPAC2 
 
 Case study: Lisbon 
Debates about the extent to which planning can help to reduce problems of affordability and 
spatial segregation have not gained as much prominence in Portugal as they have in England 
and Denmark. In Lisbon, policy concerns have tended to focus more on lessons learned and 
on solving the problems created by weak land-use and spatial planning policy, which has 
failed to prevent rapid and illegal urbanisation, characterised by poor housing conditions.  
 
The 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s were marked by the expansion of informal settlements, officially 
called ‘urban areas with illegal genesis’, which suffered various social and environmental 
problems related to a lack of basic amenities, such as electricity, sanitation and piped water. 
This was the result of the weak position of land-use planning and housing policy within the 
Portuguese welfare system – when compared with, say, health or education – and also of 
hefty demand for housing from inflows of rural to urban migration and from hundreds of 
thousands of refugees and ‘retornados’ – returnees fleeing from liberation struggles in the 
former Portuguese colonies (e.g. Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau). In 1993, a 
housing survey carried out in Lisbon identified 833 shanty towns inhabited by 27,850 
families, with a total of 92,450 inhabitants (Alves, 2017).  
 
The Programa Especial de Relojamento (PER – Special Programme for Rehousing), designed 
to eradicate the shanty settlements in metropolitan Lisbon and Porto, was enacted by the 
Government in 1993 and implemented over the subsequent two decades, with the intention 
to rehouse former slum dwellers in council housing estates. A substantial quantity of social 
housing was constructed, typically on large social housing estates on the periphery of each 
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municipality, where cheap land was available (Allegra et al. 2017). Even though the model of 
large segregated social housing estates had already been strongly criticised in other 
countries (e.g. England, where planning policy was aiming at better integration of social and 
market housing within new developments), in Lisbon the model was implemented with little 
opposition. 
 
Recent academic research on the impacts of the PER in Lisbon mapped 984 informal 
settlements and 290 housing estates built to rehouse the population, as well as the 
distribution of some 2,348 family relocations (a total of 132,181 individuals) across the 
metropolitan area of Lisbon. The relocations had been implemented using a variety of 
strategies (e.g. dispersion of previous communities, rehousing of entire communities), but 
generally resulted in urban dispossessions in which vulnerable populations were removed 
from their original locations and located in more peripheral areas. Their original locations 
were then re-zoned and redeveloped for middle to high income families, thus buoying the 
economic interests of many landowners and developers. A high number of families were 
displaced to areas “of deposit” in the periphery, characterised by dense neighbourhoods, a 
lack of infrastructure, and high concentrations of vulnerable people. This deepened social 
and spatial segregation across the city and facilitated processes of stigmatisation. Figure 13 
shows the geographical extent of the relocations. 
 
Figure 13 Distribution of relocations in Lisbon PER (Special Programme for Rehousing). 
 
Source: http://expertsproject.ics.ulisboa.pt/ 
 
Today, about 3,000 families of those registered in 1993 are still waiting for resettlement 
under the PER. But there are new, post-PER cases in the metropolitan area of Lisbon that 
urgently demand solutions (Allegra et al. 2017). A study of the supply and demand of 
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housing stock in Lisbon (CML 2019) showed that 7,197 households, of which 35% are on 
intermediate incomes and 65% on low incomes, needed municipal housing. Between 2012 
and 2015, there was an exponential increase in the number of applications for municipal 
housing, yet the quantity of housing allocated has remained low, increasing from just 507 
dwellings in 2012 to 918 in 2015. 
 
To sum up, the so-called first generation of local development plans in the 1990s did not 
favour a ‘compact city’ but rather an expanded city characterised by urban sprawl. 
Additionally, local authorities did not attempt to capture part of the rise in land values 
related to land-use changes (the re-classification of rural land to urban land), allotment and 
building permits that could have helped to finance affordable housing and other public 
services and infrastructure. On the contrary, development costs imposed extra pressure on 
public budgets. 
 
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis had an impact on both the private and public sectors, 
leading to high levels of unemployment and restricted access to bank loans for the 
construction or purchase of housing. In turn, this led to a loss of vitality within the building 
industry. As governments retreated and public finance capacity diminished, citizens were 
reluctant to pay higher taxes, and the process of privatisation of existing public housing and 
land stocks increased (for more details, see Branco & Alves 2020, 2018).  
 
At the same time, the city continued to extend its vast urban perimeters in a fragmented, 
disconnected way, with large quantities of rural land remaining undeveloped but with 
planning permission. Over recent decades, changes in the law have led to enhanced 
protection of property rights for private individuals (Carvalho 2003), and the conditions for 
an active land policy, through a public land development model (for the provision of social 
and affordable homes), have become more difficult. For example, the ‘compulsory 
expropriation of land’ for the public interest has become financially more expensive for local 
authorities, and operations of land assembly and readjustment are more difficult to 
implement (see Condessa 2015). 
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 A new generation of housing policies 
On 1 October 2019, the Portuguese Parliament enacted the first Lei de bases da Habitação, a 
wide-ranging housing law that: (a) re-affirms the constitutional right to decent and 
affordable housing for all; and (b) the general objectives and instruments of the housing 
system, including local authorities’ responsibilities and powers to assess current housing 
needs in their administrative areas, and to formulate housing and land-use policies 
accordingly.  
 
The Government also launched the Nova Geração de Políticas de Habitação (New Generation 
of Housing Policies) in 2018, with two strategic programmes. The 1º Direito (first right) is a 
capital grant for the acquisition or construction of land and dwellings targeted at low income 
families. This followed a national survey of housing needs (IHRU, 2018), which identified at 
least 26,000 families living in sub-standard conditions. The Municipality of Lisbon signed a 
collaboration agreement with the Government to access a capital grant of €81 million to 
finance the construction of new housing for 4,500 households, a total investment of c. €240 
million. This is primarily a programme to support the construction of new social housing.  
 
The Programa de Arrendamento Acessível (Programme of Affordable Housing) is a tax 
incentive programme aimed at the private rented sector. Landlords who agree to let 
property below market levels (up to 20%) in Lisbon (Figure 14) through lease contracts of 
five years that match a tenant's affordability ratio set between 15% and 30%, will benefit 
from a complete relief from taxes on rental income.  
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Figure 14 Lisbon 
 
Source: Author (2019) 
In Lisbon, the housing market is so overheated that even rental values at 20% below the 
market level continue to be inaccessible to the average Portuguese family. The Mayor of 
Lisbon has emphasised that the ‘national’ programme of affordable housing (based on 80% 
market level) is not affordable in Lisbon, thereby justifying a local programme of affordable 
housing that is now the flagship of the council’s housing strategy. The main aim of the 
programme is to provide rents that are higher than social rents, but lower than market levels, 
thus targeting the middle income families. 
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Figure 15 Programa Renda Acessível (PRA) 
 
Source: http://www.lisboarendaacessivel.pt/inicio.html 
This programme involves two sub-programmes that are fully funded and managed by the 
council: the PRA Public and the PRA Partnership. The PRA Public involves 100% public 
investment (publicly funded municipal land), whereas the PRA Partnership involves a 
partnership model between the municipality of Lisbon and private developers, in which the 
public partner provides a subsidy in the form of public land and tax concessions, and the 
private partner invests in the construction or renovation of houses. Ultimately, the 
partnership should sell one third of the new dwellings to finance the investment and let the 
rest of the housing stock at levels set by the local authority. The model binds private 
landlords into long, sub-market leases and, after 30 years or so, the rented housing stock 
should be transferred to the municipality. 
 
The overall programme was presented by the municipality in 2017, promising the 
construction of 6,000 affordable houses in 15 areas of the capital, but the beginning of the 
programme was halted by the National Court of Auditors in January 2019, allegedly due to 
an unfavourable evaluation of risk for the public sector. Meanwhile, the Mayor has stated 
that the public initiative is insufficient to solve the problem and other players, with the 
necessary financial and technical capacity, are required. 
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National policy documents, such as PNPOT, housing law, and Nova Geração de Políticas 
Habitaçao, have emphasised the importance of land-use planning to minimise the impacts of 
market behaviour, restricting, for example, the opening of new short term rentals in high 
pressure tourist areas (from where low  to middle income families have been displaced).7 
Tools of land value capture that result from granting planning permission and public 
investments (in schools, libraries, etc.), and tools of inclusionary housing zoning to secure 
affordable housing alongside market housing, have not been proposed. 
 
While land value capture is an absent topic of debate in Lisbon, with the Mayor not seeking 
to limit developers’ profits that have increased year-on-year, the Municipal Master Plan 
allows the ‘credits of construction’ – that is, permits to construct at a higher density than 
otherwise would be granted in return for the inclusion of a proportion of affordable housing.  
 
The promoter who is going to build is offered credits of construction, in the 
same territory, or in another territory. The amount of building credits will 
depend on the time that the dwellings will be available for affordable rental 
housing (time will be proportional to the benefit the promoter will have). LM5 
 
Whilst several interviewees have emphasised the relevance of ‘credits of construction’ – the 
building of additional floors in return for including a proportion of social or affordable 
housing (RP7, LM4 and LM5), other interviews revealed that this measure has not actually 
been implemented, despite being proposed in the 2012 Local Development Plan (Plano 
Diretor Municipal, 2012). One interviewee explained that this was due to a lack of agreement 
between the housing and planning departments within the Municipality of Lisbon, 
concerning the conditions for implementation on the ground.  
 
For example, if housing linked to “credits of construction’ will be for sale (e.g. at 
controlled costs) or lease, or in the case of lease, who will be managing this 
housing? For how many years? Or how will beneficiaries be allocated? LM1 
 
Several interviewees criticised the public policies in Portugal that rely predominantly upon 
incentives (land density bonuses etc.), rather than on regulations. A paradigmatic example, 
according to interviewees, was the programme Reabilita Primeiro, Paga Depois (Rehabilitate 
First, Pay Later), which consisted of the sale (by public auction) of dilapidated municipal 
buildings and dwellings. The programme allowed the deferral of payment of the sale price 
                                                 
7 More recently, decree 62/2018 reinforces the power of local authorities to set quotas for “short rentals” (see 
Cocola-Gant & Gago 2019). 
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until the completion of renovation works and the placing of the property on the market, and 
did not require any quota of social or affordable housing, or any type of rent controls. 
 
Interviewees were also critical of the Operação Integrada de Entrecampos, a large pool of 
public land in the city centre of Lisbon, in the Av. da Republica, near the train and metro 
station of Entrecampos (Figure 16). This resulted from the closure and relocation of a popular 
fair, was sold to the highest bidder without requiring any proportion of social or affordable 
housing on site. The development will allow a total construction of 143,700m2 in offices and 
residential buildings. 
 
Figure 16  Entrecampos, Lisbon
 
Source: Author (2019) 
Another interviewee emphasised the importance of land value capture and redistribution: 
Planning is not neutral, and has been used as a way of multiplying land value 
by changing land-use, increasing square metres of construction, etc. What we 
have to know is whether this value will be redistributed or not, who benefits 
from this increase of value, [and whether] the plan has any measures of 
redistribution. NAP2 
 
In conclusion, in Portugal, the provision of social or affordable housing is not a condition 
required to make a proposal acceptable in land-use planning terms. Furthermore, public 
 71 
 
sector bodies have sold land and buildings for as a high price as possible, rather than at a 
lower rate to facilitate the building of affordable housing. The Government has 
underinvested in social housing for decades, and funding has been cut entirely since 2012. 
Funding for social rented housing was non-existent after PER and, even in the current 
context of a ‘new generation of housing policy’, there is still a degree of uncertainty as to 
whether future investments in Lisbon will provide more social and genuinely affordable 
housing for rent. There is also concern for those groups most in need, such as the elderly 
and those with disabilities.  
 
There is no current legal or political drive to establish the requirement of social or affordable 
housing as a condition for planning permission in Portugal or Lisbon. However, several 
experts and public officials recognise that plans should set out the contributions expected 
from development with regard to housing needs. This does not indicate a shift from public 
subsidy to a system dependent on land-value capture, rather a move to secure developer 
contributions in the form of land or dwellings, for low to middle income families, through a 
model of state provision that blends with market provision but avoids repeating the mistakes 
of the past in relation to the spatial concentration of social housing. 
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 Conclusion  
 
This report has presented some preliminary findings from a comparison between three 
European capital cities, with a focus on how their planning systems help to deliver new 
affordable housing. The populations of Copenhagen and London continue to grow, whereas 
the population in Lisbon has declined since the 1950s. Yet, in all three cities, both sale and 
rental prices per square metre have risen faster than wages, and the gaps between prices in 
the capital and the rest of the country have increased substantially. In all three cities, 
regardless of the demographic trends or characteristics of the welfare state regimes and 
housing and planning systems, housing affordability has worsened, leading to increased 
levels of inequality and social segregation. The research, based on a combination of policy 
reports, statistical data and interviews, has produced a vast amount of information that, due 
to space and time limitations, has not been fully covered here.  
 
Nevertheless, the report has shed light on: 
 
 the weaknesses and strengths of national and local policies on social and spatial 
urban inequality; and 
 the potential for interdisciplinary and horizontal/vertical coordination in the fields of 
housing and planning. 
 
There are some general principles to note.  
 
Firstly, a concept or category (such as “not for profit” or social housing), does not in itself 
define a way of providing housing in terms of rent regimes, methods of allocation, or levels 
of housing affordability. For example, in Copenhagen and London, where not for profit 
private housing organisations play a very important role in providing housing for families at 
below market levels, different methods of funding create different risk profiles in terms of 
planning and investment. In England, high levels of uncertainty regarding funding (e.g. the 
reduction of housing grants since 2010, and tenants’ right to buy) has justified strategies that 
increasingly focus on building housing for sale, with market rents being used to cross-
subsidise social housing. This has, however, led to criticism regarding the role and modus 
operandi of housing associations. A shift from the concept of social housing, which provided 
low-cost rental for people on the lowest incomes to intermediate levels of affordable rent, 
open to a broader range of household incomes (but lower than full market price), has meant 
a reduction in options for low income families, but a greater mix in terms of social 
composition. 
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In Portugal, where the not for profit sector has lost its vitality, and housing companies are 
owned by the public sector, caps on public spending and debt constrain the inclination to 
invest, and a new funding model of affordable rent (rendas acessiveis) has been introduced 
to allow higher rents for the cross-subsidisation of private investments. Local planning 
authorities in Portugal still do not have the power to require contributions from developers, 
either in the form of affordable housing or through financial contributions. Inclusionary 
housing regulation through the planning system has been used in Denmark and England 
but, in Portugal, there remains a preference for the creation of public–private partnerships, or 
concessions that involve public subsidies in form of public land, credits for construction and 
tax exemptions. 
 
Secondly, results show that, even though national housing systems differ significantly across 
national economic and social structures, in an “age of globalisation”, processes of policy 
transfer and adjustment can be observed across countries. As claimed by Peck and Theodore 
(2015), trends of “fast policy” associated with the shortening of policy development cycles 
and fast tracking decision-making have been observed among countries, demonstrating that 
“global policy models” impose an important normative power across national borders. 
Paradigmatic examples include the right to buy policy and the introduction of new kinds of 
affordable products, typically tailored to middle income households rather than low income 
earners.  
 
In Copenhagen, the implementation of a new system of flexible allocation of housing (see 
Alves 2019) with a greater number of entrepreneurial spatial planning strategies, has reduced 
options for low income families. The introduction of the 25% rule in 2016, ensuring a quota 
of new housing provided by not for profit housing associations as a precondition of planning 
approval, does not mean that new housing will actually be affordable for low income 
families.  
 
In all three cities, rising land and building costs, as well as socioeconomic inequality, explains 
increasing waiting lists and the number of vulnerable families sleeping in emergency and 
temporary accommodation, or in unfit housing. This alone seems to justify extra measures in 
order to guarantee the right to housing, i.e. rent controls, acquisition powers, land assembly, 
inclusionary housing, etc. 
 
Evidence shows that mechanisms of inclusionary housing can be used in different ways. The 
land can either be made available for building social housing by acquiring it specifically for 
that purpose (as in the case of PER in Portugal), or land and dwellings can be made available 
at below market prices in locations adjacent to, or mixed with, land designated for other 
purposes. The 25% rule in Denmark and Section 106 in England are both examples of the 
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latter, where public housing is integrated with open market housing. The costs of making 
land available, as well as some construction costs, can be subsidised out of the development 
gains arising from the development project as a whole. It is important to note that, in the 
case of Copenhagen, a minimum floor area standard and the requirement that construction 
be of high quality has inflated land acquisition and construction costs, making this kind of 
housing in new developments uneconomical for low income families. 
 
Thirdly, evidence shows that there are a variety of policy goals at national and local levels, 
including greater efficiency in relation to the development of infrastructure and housing, and 
the promotion of better living condition for citizens, including poorer citizens and 
marginalised minority groups. Economic concerns coexist with sociospatial concerns related 
to inequality or social justice, and there is potential to problematise the ways in which these 
policy aims are prioritised and translated into action. The empirical results of this project 
raise concerns about how the politics of welfare provision, including housing and land-use 
planning, have balanced land ownership rights and public interests in order to protect the 
right to housing. These politics of welfare provision have also shaped urban opportunities 
across the social and the spatial space, and have affected not only social relationships but 
also state-social relationships. The socially regressive consequences of market-orientated 
forms of urban governance over the last decade seems to require a further reconsideration 
of the power configurations that underline the system of rules that are steering the 
production of housing and the built environment. 
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 Annex 1  
 
Evolution of a dualist rental system in England, and an integrated rental system in Denmark 
 
 
 
Evolution of a dualist rental system in Portugal 
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 Annex 2  
 
Respondent profiles 
ID Organisation Date  Interview 
time 
CL1 Copenhagen local municipality  13/06/2019 01:22:00 
CL2 Copenhagen local municipality  18/06/2019 01:10:00 
CL3 Copenhagen local municipality  25/07/2019 01:29:00 
NAD1 National government representative 04/06/2019 01:10:00 
RD1 Private developer 06/06/2019 01:34:00 
RD2 University 07/06/2019 00:53:20 
RD3 University  07/06/2019 01:05:00 
RD4 Consultant  12/06/2019 01:07:00 
RD5 University 14/06/2019 01:00:00 
RD6 University 18/06/2019 00:48:00 
RD7 University 20/06/2019 01:00:00 
RD8 University 24/06/2019 01:00:00 
RD9 University 03/06/2019 00:16:01 
PDD1 Private developer 12/06/2019 01:18:00 
PDD2 Private developer 17/06/2019 01:08:00 
PDD3 Private developer 01/07/2019 01:11:00 
NPAC1 Non-profit housing association 04/06/2019 01:04:00 
NPAC2 Non-profit housing association 11/06/2019 01:26:00 
NPAC3 Non-profit housing association 19/06/2019 00:53:37 
NPAC4 Non-profit housing association 21/06/2019 01:12:00 
NPAC5 Non-profit housing association 27/07/2019 01:07:00 
NPAC6 Non-profit housing association 31/05/2019 01:07:00 
 
ID Organization Date  Interview 
time 
LA1 Local authority 21/01/2019 00:52:00 
LA2 Local authority 21/01/2019 00:36:00 
LA3 Local authority  22/02/2019 01:14:00 
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R1 GLA 22/01/2019 00:29:00 
R2 GLA  04/03/2019 00:59:00 
R3 GLA 07/03/2019 00:53:00 
N1 National authority 22/01/2019 00:51:00 
N2 National authority 28/01/2019 01:14:00 
A1 National stakeholder/ Expert 16/01/2019 01:00:00 
A2 University 04/02/2019 01:35:00 
A3 University 19/02/2019 01:03:00 
A4 University 28/02/2019 00:48:00 
P1 Private developer 19/03/2019 00:41:00 
P2 Privat developer 19/03/2019 00:32:00 
NP1 Non-profit housing association 18/01/2019 01:00:00 
NP2 Non-profit housing association 01/03/2019 00:49:00 
NP3 Non-profit housing association 11/03/2019 00:47:00 
NP4 Non-profit housing association 11/03/2019 00:14:00 
NP5 Non-profit housing association 18/03/2019 00:24:00 
NP6 Non-profit housing association 18/03/2019 00:15:00 
 
ID Organization Date  Interview 
time 
LM1 Lisbon municipality 11/04/2019 01:06:32 
LM2 Lisbon municipality  11/04/2019 01:06:07 
LM3 Lisbon municipality  15/04/2019 01:14:01 
LM4 Lisbon municipality  16/04/2019 01:02:30 
LM5 Lisbon municipality  15/05/2019 01:26:00 
CC1 Metropolitan authority 29/04/2019 01:27:00 
CC2 Metropolitan authority 22/05/2019 01:26/2019 
NAP1 National authority  03/04/2019 01:45:00 
NAP2 National authority  29/04/2019 01:18:00 
NAP3 National authority  21/05/2019 01:19:00 
NAP4 National authority  22/05/2019 01:38:50 
RP1 Consultant 03/04/2019 01:03:00 
RP2 Consultant 08/04/2019 01:24:00 
RP3 University 08/04/2019 00:43:00 
RP4 University 10/04/2019 00:39:00 
RP5 University 16/04/2019 01:19:55 
RP6 University 26/04/2019 00:54:38 
RP7 University 26/04/2019 01:13:00 
RP8 University 02/05/2019 01:40:00 
PDP1 Private developer 29/04/2019 00:54:00 
CO1 Non profit Housing Association 27/05/2019 01:37:51 
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